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Preface 
What happens to international environmental agreements once they are 
signed, and how does the implementation of such agreements influence their 
effectiveness? These are the questions that motivate the Implementation and 
Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (IEC) Project at 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). 
In this essay, Marc Levy, Oran Young, and Michael Ziirn survey the 
literature on international "regimes." Regimes are social institutions that 
influence the behavior of states and their subjects. They consist of both 
informal and formalized principles and norms, as well as specific rules and 
procedures. Nearly all environmental regimes include one or more formal 
agreements among states . Scholarship over the last decade has elaborated 
how regimes are formed; this essay surveys that work and focuses on more 
recent scholarship that has turned from the formation of regimes to the 
question of what makes regimes "effective." 
This review essay is one part of IEC's effort to build a database of the 
key variables related to the formation, operation, and effectiveness of inter-
national regimes. The database will enable the testing of hypotheses about 
regime effectiveness using evidence from a large number of cases simulta-
neously. Existing research has led to hypotheses and tests based on single 
case studies or small samples of cases, but conclusions have been difficult to 
apply to other cases because variables are left uncontrolled and the social 
processes are complex. In contrast , the IEC database effort will include all 
major variables related to effectiveness. The team will employ experts in 
each case to perform the coding, thus allowing for assessments (including 
subjective evaluations) of a wide range of data. 
After two trial runs, the team is now finalizing the data protocol, as 
well as a manual that describes the principal questions in the data protocol 
and how they should be answered. The protocol and manual will refine the 
variables we are coding and their relationship to major hypotheses. 
David G. Victor 
Project Co-leader 
International Environmental Commitments Project, IIASA 
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The article surveys the literature on international 'regimes' . Regimes 
arc social institutions that influence the behavior of states and their 
subjects. They consist of informal and formalized principles and norms, 
as well as specific rules, procedures and programs. The term is explicitly 
broad and captures the unwritten understandings and relationships, as 
well as the formal legal agreements, that influence how states and 
individuals behave in any given issue area. Scholarship over the last 
decade has elaborated how regimes are formed; this article surveys that 
work and focuses on more recent scholarship that has turned from the 
formation of regimes to the question of what makes regimes in general 
'effective ' and which 'types of regimes' are especially effective. The 
survey concludes with the identification of future research priorities in 
the field. 
1. Introduction 
More than a decade after the publication of the well-known special issue of 
International Organisation on regimes, the study of international institu-
tions is alive and well. Perhaps the best proof lies in the length of this 
state-of-the-art report. Although a number of assessments of research on 
international regimes have appeared during the last decade, most confine 
their attention to certain aspects of international institutions. 1 The excellent 
contribution of Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons (1987), for instance, 
focuses on studies of regime formation (see also Efinger et al ., 1993). The 
most recent contributions of this kind are more comprehensive in that they 
consider both regime formation and regime consequences. Even so, they 
address work done in specific academic communities (Rittberger, l 993b; 
Keohane, 1993) or in the context of specific projects (e.g. Haas et al., 1993; 
Mayer et al., 1993; Young and Osherenko, 1993). In this report, by 
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contrast, we seek to make a more comprehensive evaluation, placing 
particular emphasis on recent developments and on future directions in 
research on international regimes. As will become apparent, research efforts 
in this field are shifting toward regime consequences in contrast to regime 
formation. They also make increasing use of theoretical insights drawn from 
analytic constructs outside the realm of rational choice models . 
These developments in regime analysis reflect two underlying concerns 
that drive research on international institutions. The original analytic 
concern ofregime analysis was to demonstrate, against neorealist claims, that 
institutions are a necessary ingredient of any theory of world politics. Today, 
this general point is more or less accepted, and the open questions are more 
specific: how do institutions affect world politics, how do institutions 
(including their formation) interact with actors (including their interest 
formation), and what are the independent consequences of regimes? The 
original normative concern, by contrast, was a desire to understand the 
consequences for the international economic order of a relative decline in 
American dominance. Although we now know that international regimes 
can form and become effective in the absence of a hegemon, the open 
questions are: how can new international institutions direct actor behavior in 
desired directions in various issue areas, how can international regimes foster 
learning on the part of participating actors, and how can international 
institutions restructure domestic institutions? In this connection, many 
recent studies focus on international environmental regimes, an area 
conducive to the analysis of the new analytical and normative concerns 
underlying regime analysis . 
This report reflects these recent developments in regime analysis. In this 
sense, it may appear that the examples we use to illustrate theoretical 
arguments are unbalanced in one way or another. At the same time, the 
report is more balanced than previous surveys in covering the four sets of 
questions driving most research on international institutions: 
1. Under what conditions and through what mechanisms (why and how) 
do international regimes come into existence? Can institutions form in the 
absence of a power monopoly and without the participation of a hegemon? 
Is it possible for international regimes to come into existence when they are 
needed or do they emerge only in special situations? What kinds of processes 
lead to the formation of international regimes? Do different types of regimes 
follow different paths of regime formation? 
2 . Do regimes persist even when the circumstances in which they came 
into existence change? To what extent are they independent of the 
exogenous forces that form them? Are regimes robust enough to survive a 
deterioration of the overall relationship among the participants and, at the 
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same time, flexible enough to adapt to changes? What mechanisms give 
regimes independence and robustness? Are regimes featuring specific 
attributes more persistent and robust than others? What makes some regimes 
more flexible than others? 
3. What consequences of regimes for state behavior and problem-solving 
can we observe? Do regimes serve the goals that led to their creation? What 
stated goals do regimes usually espouse? Are the stated goals indeed those 
that are pursued? Under what conditions do regimes make a difference? Are 
certain types of regimes more conducive to goal attainment than others? 
Through what mechanisms do regimes influence outcomes? 
4 . What long-term effects on national political systems and the structure 
of world politics do regimes have? Why and how do such effects occur? Are 
individual participants aware of these long-term consequences? What are the 
consequences of regimes with regard to traditional notions of democracy? 
How do they affect social and political constellations in the participating 
countries? Do regimes play a civilizing role in world politics, and if so, 
how? 
Although these four sets of questions are clearly interrelated, answering 
them may require different strategies of inquiry. In this sense, regime 
analysis may be less straightforward and focused than is usually assumed. Yet 
the different strands of regime analysis are complementary in that we must 
provide satisfactory answers to all four sets of questions to develop a 
comprehensive ' regime theory' that meets the underlying concerns of 
regime analysis. In this article, we summarize and draw together 
international research on regimes and institutions against the background of 
what an ideal 'regime theory' would be able to tell us . This procedure serves 
two ends. It provides a state-of-the-art report that evaluates research on 
regimes over the last decade and identifies blank spots in existing knowledge . 
Our contribution also constitutes a basis for building a 'database of 
international regimes', an endeavor in which we are currently involved. 
Although answering different questions associated with regime analysis may 
require different research strategies, it is helpful to have an inventory 
encompassing the information gathered in research on regimes along all 
dimensions. The development of an appropriate format for such an 
inventory requires a profound knowledge of all relevant work as well as a 
good sense of future directions in regime analysis. Since three individuals can 
at best approximate these requirements, we invite readers of this article to 
provide input regarding the format and content of the regimes database. 
Before addressing the major research questions that drive regime analysis, 
it is important to focus on defining international regimes and distinguishing 
among different types of regimes. These matters are not important as ends 
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in themselves. But they are instrumental in answering all the questions raised 
in regime analysis. 
2. Defining and Classifying International Regimes 
In a recent volume of the International Social Science Journal, three 
European scholars evaluate the contributions of regime analysis to our 
understanding of international organization. All three are highly critical of 
what they call 'regime theory'. One of their major criticisms concerns the 
definition of regimes: 'In fact, the regime concept, as used by adepts of this 
approach, has never been clearly defined .... Definitions of the concept 
cover a mixed bag of subjects reflecting different meanings' (de Senarclens, 
1993: 456). In a generally balanced rejoinder, Helen Milner concedes that 
'Defining a regime remains a difficult task; one could say that despite the 
consensus definition proposed by Krasner a decade ago, the concept is still 
essentially contested' (Milner, 1993: 493-4). Given this background, it is 
important to tackle the definitional issue directly. In this section, we also 
offer some thoughts on distinctions among different types of international 
institutions that are likely to prove theoretically useful. 
2.1 What Are International Regimes? 
Critics have attacked the often cited consensus definition (Krasner, 1983a)2 
for two major reasons. One criticism points to the difficulty in differentiating 
the four components of regimes (indistinguishable components); the other 
characterizes the standard definition as vague because it does not resolve 
differences among those who study international regimes regarding the 
boundaries of the universe of cases (vagueness). In addressing these 
criticisms, we do not seek to offer another alternative. Rather, we endeavour 
to modify and concretize the consensus definition in a way 
that accommodates different understandings but also allows analysts to 
distinguish among them. The goal is to be inclusive enough to per-
mit comparisons among sets of regimes defined in somewhat different ways 
but, at the same time, to be precise enough to make these comparisons 
meaningful. 
Vagueness. There is broad agreement about at least two elements of the 
consensus definition. First, it treats regimes as social institutions in the sense 
of stable sets of rules, roles and relationships. 3 Second, it characterizes 
regimes as issue-area specific in contrast to the broader or deeper institu-
tional structure of international society as a whole. Examples of deep 
structure include the ideas of pacta sunt servanda and diffuse reciprocity. 
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Although it may be true that much of regime theory misses 'the crucial link 
between the costs and benefits of specific legal rules and the role of 
international law as constitutive of the structure of the state system itself' 
(Hurrell, 1993: 59), many studies of regimes have pointed to this 
institutional embeddedness as a topic requiring more attention (Ruggie, 
1983; Young, 1989a: 13). 
Given this substantial consensus in conceptual terms, we turn to 
controversies about the adequacy of efforts to operationalize the concept of 
international regimes. Much of the criticism of definitional fuzziness points 
to the problem of knowing regimes when we see them rather than knowing 
what we are talking about in discussions of international regimes. Whereas 
an informal understanding of what makes up an international regime is often 
sufficient to formulate sensible research designs for 'in-house' projects, the 
cumulation of knowledge based on comparisons of the findings of different 
projects requires a more formal operationalization. 
Since rules are more well defined and concrete than principles and norms, 
they constitute the right starting-point for operationalizing international 
regimes. The term 'rules' is ambiguous because it is used both in the sense 
of'as a rule' (regularity) and in the sense of'follow the rule' (prescription). 
Given the basic thrust of regime analysis as a tool for understanding 
international cooperation and the role of norms in the pursuit of 
cooperation, there is a need to go beyond merely routinized or patterned 
behavior.4 The principal claim of regime analysis is that states may generate 
institutions in identifiable issue areas that affect their behavior and foster 
cooperation, even if short-term interests would dictate deviation . Patterned 
behavior, by contrast, may also emerge in the absence of institutions, and it 
does not presuppose cooperation. 
Two procedures for operationalizing the consensus definition have 
received attention . According to the first, we should look for explicit rules or 
injunctions (with an embodiment independent of the actors) . The second 
suggests adding an element of observable behavior to the definition 
(Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 494; Wolf and Zurn, 1986: 205 ). Both 
operationalizations have serious drawbacks when taken to extremes. The 
substantive procedure is in danger of circular reasoning - identifying 
regimes on the basis of observed behavior and then using regimes to explain 
this behavior. In addition, this approach requires difficult causal inferences 
about regimes in order to identify them. On the other hand, a purely formal 
operationalization includes numerous 'paper regimes' or, more generally, an 
inflated universe of cases. 
A closer inspection reveals that these are not the only options. The debate 
actually involves two separable dimensions. With respect to each of these 
dimensions, the literature includes different notions of what is needed before 
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Figure 1 
Regime Definitions 
Convergence of Expectations 
Low High 
no regimes tacit regimes 
dead letter regimes classic regimes 
we can speak about the existence of an international regime. The first 
dimension highlights the degree of formality of the rules, whereas the 
second features the degree to which the expectations of actors converge. 
Taken together, we can use these dimensions to construct a matrix that 
displays different notions of international regimes (see Figure 1). 
We do not think it makes sense to use the term 'regime' in the absence of 
both a minimum degree of formalization and a minimum degree of 
convergence in expectations. The northwest cell of Figure 1 is therefore 
empty. 'Dead letter regimes' feature the existence of explicit rules including 
both substantive and procedural prescriptions articulated in written form, 
whether or not they are legally binding. Although the numerous truce 
agreements in Bosnia are cases featuring explicit rules that cast doubt on the 
value of this operationalization, the fact that it is easy to identify explicit 
rules makes this criterion attractive (Keohane, 1993: 26-9) . The term 'tacit 
regimes', by contrast, refers to those cases in which regular but implicit 
references to informal rules are common along with behavior that is 
consistent with some independently inferred rules (Lipson, 1991). The 
balance of power system in 19th-century Europe and the system of spheres 
of influence among the superpowers after World War II are examples of this 
type of regime. 'Classic regimes' exist in those issue areas in which in 
addition to explicit rules and regular references to them, rule-consistent 
behavior is widespread. Rule-consistent behavior can be inferred when ( 1) 
clear violations remain the exception, ( 2) parties harmed by violations 
protest against them by implicitly or explicitly referring to the agreed upon 
rules and ( 3) violators do not deny the rules and norms referred to in these 
protests.5 We use the term 'classic regime' for such cases since the presence 
of all indicators - explicit rules, regular references to the rules, rule-
consistent behavior - ensures that virtually every regime analyst would 
agree that international regimes exist under these conditions; the study of 
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these cases undoubtedly constitutes the core of regime analysis . The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) regime and the ozone regime are 
well-known cases in point. 
We do not think that it is sensible to push for exclusive reliance on one of 
these three approaches to operationalization. Each approach has significant 
virtues. We therefore propose to consider all three notions of regimes in our 
survey of the field. Using a procedure involving several explicitly specified 
entry criteria will allow scholars to construct arguments about both the 
formation and the impact of international regimes employing different 
universes of cases. So long as individual analysts are careful to state clearly 
the universe they are referring to, this procedure should facilitate the growth 
of knowledge rather than becoming a source of confusion. 6 
Indistinguishable Components. The second criticism asserts that distinctions 
among principles, norms and rules lack intersubjective meaning. This leads 
to the suggestion that the distinction be dropped in favor of focusing 
exclusively on explicit injunctions. There is something to be said for this 
argument. Yet drawing such distinctions may still be heuristically useful, if 
we are able to provide some guidelines for discrimination. Principles involve 
goal orientations and causal beliefs cast at the level of general policy arenas, 
like economics, security or the environment. The economic regimes created 
by the Western states after 1945, for example, were based on the principle of 
'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie, 1983). Norms describe general rights and 
obligations that operate mainly on the level of issue areas. But they are still 
so general that it is often impossible to determine whether or not specific 
actions violate them. It is hard to say, for example, whether states have really 
followed the norm of 'conditional reduction of trade barriers'. Rules are the 
most concrete of the components referred to in the consensus definition. 
They are often stated explicitly in the formal agreements on which regimes 
are commonly based, and they facilitate assessments of implementation and 
compliance. Rules may, for example, specify explicit targets and timetables 
for tariff reductions called for in a specific industrial sector (Keohane, 1984; 
58; Krasner, 1983b: 4-5 ). Of course, these are approximate distinctions. Yet 
the resultant imprecision is not critical for purposes of identifying regimes 
since differentiating among principles, norms and rules does not figure in 
defining regimes in the first place. 
Since the cost of retaining these distinctions is low, we ask whether their 
use has potential benefits. We see two advantages. These distinctions 
contribute to the descriptive richness that is a major strength of regime 
analysis, acknowledged by the critics of this research program.7 Also, and 
more importantly, distinguishing among principles, norms and rules makes it 
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possible to classify regimes in ways that may prove useful in explaining 
regime formation and regime consequences. 
To sum up, we suggest defining international regimes as social institutions 
consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs 
that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas. As such, regimes 
give rise to recognized social practices in international society. Defined in 
this way, regimes are distinct from international organizations which are 
material entities,8 from the broader structure of international society which 
consists of encompassing principles of conduct valid across all issue areas, 
and from the world order which encompasses the sum of all the institutional 
arrangements operative at the international level. On this account, inter-
national regimes may or may not include conventions . In his well-known 
study, Lewis (1969) separates conventions from institutions on the basis of 
the constellation of interests in which they are embedded (see also Schotter, 
1981; Snidal, 1985a; Ullmann-Margalit, 1977). But when regimes are 
defined and operationalized in terms of social rules, it is not feasible to use 
the social environment of the rules to separate conventions (which also 
contain rules) from regimes. 9 In effect, various characteristics of the social 
environment - the basis of the distinction between conventions and other 
institutions - become criteria which we can use to subdivide the overall 
universe of international regimes into subsets. 
2.2 Classifications of Regimes 
The principal reason for classifying regimes is to facilitate the formulation of 
hypotheses about regime formation and regime consequences. Thus, it is 
easy to envision the development of generalizations applying to subsets of 
regimes but not to the entire universe of international regimes. To 
strengthen the institutionalist point of view, moreover, we ought to be able 
to account for variations in the consequences of international regimes by 
referring to the character of these institutions (endogenous variables) instead 
of by referring only to the causal factors used to explain variation among 
regimes in the first place (exogenous variables). Among students of domestic 
politics, the most convincing demonstrations that different institutional 
arrangements matter involve showing how different types of political 
institutions lead to different outcomes. When Maurice Duverger developed 
the hypothesis that polities with majority voting lead to two-party systems 
whereas proportional voting generates multi-party systems, for example, he 
correctly focused on institutional differences to explain divergent outcomes. 
Other conceivable explanations of the number of parties in a given political 
system, such as the number of social cleavages within a society, might affect 
both the voting system and the party system. But focusing on these 
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cleavages does not help us to understand the consequences of the political 
institutions. If institutions matter - at a minimum by mediating between 
underlying structures and outcomes in an issue area - we should be able to 
understand outcomes in that area by highlighting these institutional 
arrangements. 
All discussions of regime classifications confront a common problem. 
Innumerable regime attributes or properties can be used for classificatory 
purposes, and we lack good a priori criteria regarding what sorts of 
classifications will prove useful in future research. So far, empirical research 
on international regimes has not made systematic and explanatory use of 
regime classifications. Therefore, we cannot report replicated findings about 
typical formation paths or consequences of specific types of regimes. We 
draw the following conclusion from this. Systematic and sustained efforts to 
classify regimes constitute a blank spot in our understanding of international 
regimes which deserves more research. Given this situation, it seems sensible 
to start by focusing on variations in 'core properties' of regimes. These are 
attributes that are explicitly mentioned in defining regimes. In the following 
paragraphs, then, we first take up the principal regime components 
(principles, norms, rules, programs and procedures), and then move on to 
classifications pointing to variations in types of actors as well as to differences 
in the issue areas to which the rules apply. 
Principles and Norms. Classifying international regimes on the basis of 
different types of principles and norms constitutes the most familiar 
approach to this issue . 
1. Regimes may or may not involve functional differentiation. According 
to sociological theory, regimes featuring a principled (as opposed to a 
practical) differentiation ofroles among the participants (e.g. flag vs. port vs . 
coastal states or upstream vs. downstream states) exhibit higher degrees of 
institutionalization . We therefore expect that functionally differentiated 
regimes will be more difficult to create; they come into existence only as part 
of larger institutional networks. Yet once established, we expect them to be 
more influential in terms of consequences and to display greater robust-
ness. 
2 . A comparatively well-established idea classifies regimes in terms of the 
assignment of property rights or the mode of allocation determined by their 
principles . Thus, we can distinguish among regimes serving to promote 
internationalization (e .g. the international sea-bed regime), nationalization 
(e.g. exclusive economic zones) and free access and exchange (e.g. 
international waters). Perhaps the most prominent hypothesis associated 
with this classification is the theory of hegemonic stability, which is not only 
275 
Marc A. Levy et al. 
a theory of regime formation but also predicts the emergence of regimes 
facilitating free exchange and access under conditions of high concentration 
in overall structural power (Krasner, 1976). Some also argue that this 
classification is especially relevant to the distributional effects of regimes . 
Liberal or market-oriented regimes, which feature free exchange and access, 
may cause asymmetric distributions of resources between states and within 
states. Yet market-oriented regimes are expected to be particularly efficient, 
so that they increase overall social welfare. State-oriented regimes, which 
feature national property rights, probably reduce inequalities in the distribu-
tion of resources between states, but they do not necessarily alter domestic 
inequalities. In contrast, regimes that assign property rights to international 
authorities may allow for a more equal distribution of resources between and 
within states, but they are also likely to foster serious inefficiencies, as in the 
case of the common agricultural policy of the European Union (Krasner, 
1985: 5-14; Wolf, 1991; Zurn, 1987: 45-6). 
3. John Ruggie has developed an interpretation of multilateralism that 
emphasizes the underlying principle of cooperation rather than the number 
of participants involved. Multilateralism, on this account, describes institu-
tions that build on (a) anti-discrimination as a generalized principle of 
conduct, ( b) the principle of indivisibility and ( c) the principle of diffuse 
reciprocity, where these elements are treated as an indivisible ensemble 
(Ruggie, 1992: 570-3; see also Caporaso, 1992: 599-632). Accordingly, 
multilateral institutions can only prevail when multilateralism reflects a 
dominant normative orientation in the domestic practices of a hegemon or, 
more generally, the leading members of a regime (Ruggie, 1992: 592). With 
regard to regime consequences, liberal social theory suggests that multi-
lateral regimes will produce more benign effects than others. 
4 . It is possible also to classify regimes in terms of goal orientation. We 
may distinguish regimes that serve mainly to increase the utility of regime 
participants in absolute terms (internal regimes) , for example, from those 
that seek to improve the position of members relative to outsiders (external 
regimes) (Zurn, 1987: 40-5). To operationalize this distinction, we can look 
at membership rules. A related distinction separates open institutions (e.g. 
the UN), conditionally open institutions (e.g. IMF, GATT) and institutions 
with restricted membership (e.g. NATO, OPEC, EU), with the latter being 
most externally oriented (Keohane, 1993: 39). 
Rules. Efforts to classify regimes in terms of different types of rules 
commonly draw on judicial and sociological theory: 
1. In her well-known work Governing the Commons. Elinor Ostrom 
argues that 'Institutional rules are prescriptive statements that forbid, 
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require, or permit some action or outcome. One of the three deontic 
operators - forbid, require, permit - must be contained in a statement for 
it to be considered as a rule' (Ostrom, 1990: 139).10 We can therefore 
classify regimes on the basis of whether they highlight prohibitions, 
requirements or permissions. Although we do not know of existing 
hypotheses, this distinction may shed light on regime formation and 
consequences in much the same way that Theodore Lowi's parallel 
distinction among regulative, distributive and redistributive policies has 
contributed to understanding different policy-making processes in domestic 
political systems (Lowi, 1964). We may expect also that requiring rules will 
be the most hotly contested, whereas permitting rules are much easier to 
implement, and prohibitions lie in between. 
2. Thomas Franck has argued that international rules exert a normative 
pull toward compliance to the extent that they are legitimate . Consequently, 
he asks what observable characteristics of rules increase or decrease their . 
legitimacy and therefore their pull toward compliance. Four characteristics 
of rules appear to enhance legitimacy: (a) determinateness and clarity, (b) 
symbolic validation within the participating community, ( c) internal coher-
ence and ( d) vertical links between a primary rule of obligation, which is the 
system's workhorse, and a hierarchy of secondary rules, which identify the 
sources of rules and establish 'normative standards that define how rules are 
to be made, interpreted, and applied' (Franck, 1990: 184). Regime analysis 
should seek to test this complex hypothesis carefully, not least for the 
contributions this effort can make to the debate between rationalists and 
reflectivists . 
3. A regime may be described as strong when its rules are dense, specific 
and cover a broad range of activities (Keohane, 1993: 41-3) . Clearly, weak 
regimes will be limited in terms of problem-solving capacity. Nonetheless, a 
strong regime may encounter compliance problems, at least in the short run, 
since the number of inconvenient commitments increases with the number 
and breadth of rules . If a regime exhibiting high rule density survives its first 
challenges (e.g. a change of governments, deterioration in overall relation-
ships among members), however, it can be expected to be resilient in 
subsequent periods, since the rules have a stabilizing effect upon each 
other. 
Procedures and Programs. Typologies of regimes featuring distinctions 
among decision-making procedures are numerous . Work on international 
organizations that highlights the effects of different voting systems 
(Freeman and Cannizo, 1981; Lister, 1984) or the secretariat's role in 
decision-making (Cox and Jacobson, 1973) is relevant here. Yet three 
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other characteristics of decision-making procedures seem to us especially 
important. 
l. If a regime that is initially weak (as defined above) is accompanied by 
a decision-making procedure that is autonomous in the sense of being able 
to revise rules, the regime is apt to foster learning at the international level 
and to lead to the establishment of new rules . Institutions have strong 
decision-making procedures if changes are carried out according to an ex 
ante plan or, in other words, a procedure spelled out in the regime itself 
(Kenneth Shepsle, cited in Ostrom, 1990: 58). We may call such arrange-
ments evolutionary regimes. Regimes of this type may turn out to be 
successful as problem-solvers in the long run by giving a strong impetus to 
learning. Many environmental protection arrangements are good examples 
of this regime type (Haas et al., 1993; Breitmeier et al., 1993). In contrast, 
reliant or static regimes, where decision-making procedures are not suffi-
ciently developed to react to external changes, can turn out to be brittle in 
the face of external changes. They can be expected as well to have a low 
impact with regard to learning. Still, regimes of this kind may prove effective 
in managing prolonged conflicts of a static nature. A case in point is the 
Berlin regime (Schwarzer, 1990). 
2. We can speculate as well about the character of collective-choice 
mechanisms in autonomous regimes. A rough distinction separates institu-
tions in which most members affected by the rules participate in modifying 
them (e .g . the SALT-based regime) and those in which a few privileged 
members have the authority to modify the rules (e .g . the IMF-based 
regime). We would expect the distribution of benefits flowing from 
cooperation to vary in terms of this difference. 
3. Regimes also differ with regard to their compliance mechanisms, 
including monitoring, sanctioning, and dispute-resolution procedures. 
Where compliance mechanisms are highly developed, we would expect that 
the regime was established to solve what game theory characterizes as a 
dilemma. Regimes with strong compliance mechanisms can be expected to 
alter the behavior of regime participants considerably. On the other hand, 
weak monitoring, sanctioning and dispute-resolution procedures should 
characterize regimes emerging in situations resembling games (Martin, 
1992; Stein, 1983); they will alter behavior only moderately. Despite the 
emphasis rational choice theorists place on them (Coleman, 1990: Chs 
10-11; Ostrom, 1990), the analysis of compliance mechanisms remains an 
underdeveloped dimension of regime analysis . 
Actors and Issue Areas. International regimes govern the interactions of 
actors in specific issue areas. It follows that regimes may vary with respect to 
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the number and type of actors involved as well as the type and scope of issues 
covered or, in other words, the problem structure . The number of actors 
participating in an international regime may vary from two to the complete 
set of states . Whereas it is more difficult to create regimes with many actors, 
we do not know much about the effects of numbers on regime con-
sequences. Still, it is more or less accepted that the participation of non-state 
actors (e.g. Greenpeace or Amnesty International) and epistemic commu-
nities, at least in the rule-implementation stage, does improve the 
effectiveness of environmental regimes . We can expect as well that learning 
will be positively affected by agreements that include non-state actors (Haas, 
1992; Haas et al., 1993). 
Little effort has been made so far to use distinctions involving problem 
structure to account for differences in regime consequences, though they 
have proved useful in accounting for differences in the likelihood of regime . 
formation. Some analysts argue, however, that when the principles and 
norms of a regime are nested together with other regimes, the regime 
becomes highly resilient in the face of deterioration in the overall relation-
ships to which it relates (Keohane, 1984; Muller, 1993b). Furthermore, 
where networks of regimes link the same set of participants, actors' 
perceptions of each other's behavior are more likely to be affected than 
where regimes are isolated. 
This quick survey points to a number of ways to classify regimes that may 
be useful in efforts to understand their formation and their consequences. 
Yet most of these distinctions remain unexplored empirically. The develop-
ment and use of regime typologies require a research design emphasizing 
comparisons among cases, a point of considerable importance given that 
much research on international regimes to date has taken the form of single 
case studies or structured, focused comparisons using a small number of 
cases. Only by studying a larger number of cases comparatively can we 
develop regime typologies that contribute significantly to our understanding 
of the role of international regimes in world politics. 
3. Regime Formation 
Regime formation, a subject that encompasses the reformation of existing 
institutional arrangements as well as the creation of new institutions where 
none have previously existed, has emerged as one of the central concerns of 
the 'new institutionalism' in International Relations (Keck, 1991; 
Moravcsik, 1992; Zacher and Matthew, 1992; Young, 1994) . The study of 
regime formation can be broken down into three distinct - albeit 
interrelated - topics (Young and Osherenko, 1993). There is, first, the 
basic question of whether those parties interested in a given issue succeed in 
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forming a regime or fail to reach closure on the terms of a mutually 
agreeable institutional arrangement. In cases where regime formation is 
ultimately successful, it is pertinent to proceed to a second topic by asking 
how long it takes to move from the appearance of an issue on the active 
international agenda to the conclusion of an agreement setting forth the 
terms of a regime. As the cases of East-West relations in Europe (Rittberger 
and Zurn, 1990), Antarctica and the northern fur seal attest (Beck, 1986; 
Mirovitskaya et al., 1993), it is not uncommon for two decades or more to 
elapse in the effort to reach agreement on the terms of an international 
regime, a matter of growing concern to those who believe we have entered 
an era of rapidly escalating environmental and other crises. Third, we want 
to ask about the substantive content or character of the regimes created to 
deal with international issues. This is a matter of particular concern to those 
who emphasize the importance of tailoring the features of specific institu-
tional arrangements to the nature of the problems they are created to solve. 
A comprehensive theory of regime formation should allow us to account for 
success or failure in efforts to establish regimes, the time it takes to reach 
agreement in successful cases, and the substantive provisions set forth in 
constitutional contracts devised for individual regimes . 
The major analytic issues raised in the study of regime formation can be 
grouped into six broad categories: behavior of the actors in regime 
formation, processes of regime formation, stages of regime formation, 
driving social forces, cross-cutting factors and multivariate models. 
3.1 Actors and Actor Behavior 
Most students of international regimes accept the view that the members of 
these arrangements are states. But this does not mean that non-state actors 
and even individuals are irrelevant to processes of regime formation; far from 
it. Increasingly, non-state actors loom large in framing issues for inclusion on 
the international agenda and in focusing attention on specific issues in a way 
that induces states to work toward the creation of institutional arrangements 
dealing with them. Today, representatives of non-state actors frequently 
serve as members of national delegations working on the provisions of 
international regimes. Often they are also accepted as observers in their own 
right. All this has important consequences for the nature of the political 
dynamics involved in both the initial creation and the reformation of 
international institutions. But it does not alter the fact that regimes are 
properly understood as social practices created to guide interactions among 
the members of international society (that is, states) in identifiable issue 
areas. 
Early studies of regime formation treated participating states as unitary 
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actors seeking to maximize some sort of national interest. But this practice 
has given way to a number of newly emerging lines of analysis emphasizing 
the fact that the participants in regime formation are complex collective 
entities. Perhaps the most influential of these is the study of two-level games, 
a perspective that emphasizes the linkages between bargaining among states 
and bargaining within individual states over positions to be taken at the 
international level (Putnam, 1988; Evans et al., 1993). But several other 
lines of analysis are noteworthy in this connection as well. Some writers have 
examined the cultural and institutional roots of behavioral differences 
among states participating in processes ofregime formation (Vernon, 1993). 
Others have focused on the role of scientists in developing the positions of 
states on a range of issues including the loss of stratospheric ozone, threats 
to biological diversity and climate changes (Susskind, 1994). Still others 
have proposed the idea of regime-conducive foreign policies and endeavored 
to identify links between various features of domestic politics and the 
articulation of foreign policies of this type (Zurn, 1993). 
3.2 Processes of Regime Formation 
Three distinct visions of the process of regime formation have emerged in 
the literature on international regimes: self-generation, negotiation and 
imposition (Young, 1983). All regimes are expected to feature explicit -
though not necessarily formal - rules in the end, 11 but the processes 
involved in reaching this point can vary greatly. Thus, a self-generating or 
spontaneous regime is one that emerges through some process of converg-
ing expectations that does not require conscious efforts on the part of those 
who become participants in the resultant social practice. Much favored by 
political conservatives because it obviates the need for institutional design or 
social engineering, this process is often described as a means of producing 
order without law (Ellickson, 1991). A negotiated regime is one that arises 
from a conscious process of bargaining in which the parties engage in 
extended efforts to hammer out mutually agreeable provisions to incorp-
orate into an explicit agreement. Thought by many, including most 
practitioners, to be the primary process of regime formation in international 
society, negotiation has become a familiar feature of the landscape of 
international institutional affairs . An imposed regime, by contrast, is an 
arrangement that is favored by a single powerful actor (or, in some cases, a 
small coalition of powerful actors) that succeeds in inducing others to accede 
to its institutional preferences . Favored by those who think in terms of 
structural power and look for ruling elites as the prime movers in the 
creation of institutions, imposition can also be interpreted more benignly as 
a process through which leading actors supply institutional arrangements 
281 
Marc A. Levy et al. 
looked upon as public goods to privileged groups (Olson, 1965; Snidal, 
1985b). 
The study of actual cases of regime formation suggests that these 
distinctions are best thought of as analytic rather than concrete in character. 
What this means is that specific instances of regime formation are apt to 
exhibit elements of all three processes, though one or another may be 
particularly prominent in individual cases. As those who have analyzed tacit 
bargaining have made clear, for example, successful negotiations regularly 
involve some convergence of expectations that cannot be explained through 
a study of the explicit bargaining process (Schelling, 1960; Axelrod, 1984; 
Downs and Rocke, 1990). Similarly, studies of bargaining strength have 
produced a rich set of observations about factors governing success or failure 
on the part of powerful actors seeking to bring their structural resources to 
bear on the process of regime formation (Young, 1994). The fact that the 
terms of international regimes are generally articulated in formal agree-
ments, therefore, should not lead us to overlook self-generation and 
imposition as important aspects of the process of regime formation. The 
challenge before us at this point is to improve our grasp of the interactions 
among these processes as they play out in specific cases. 
3.3 Stages of Regime Formation 
Recent work has made it clear that it is useful to divide the process of regime 
formation into at least three stages: agenda formation, institutional choice 
and operationalization. The stage of agenda formation encompasses the 
emergence of an issue on the political agenda, the framing of the issue for 
consideration in international forums and the rise of the issue to a high 
enough place on the international agenda to warrant priority treatment 
(Stein, 1989). Institutional choice takes an issue from the point where it 
becomes a priority item on the international agenda to the point of 
agreement on the provisions of a specific regime. Operationalization covers 
all those activities required to transform an agreement on paper into a 
functioning social practice (Jacobson and Weiss, 1990). In international 
society, the operationalization stage often involves efforts on the part of 
member states to bring a regime 's rules to bear on various non-state actors 
(e.g. fishers, oil tanker owners/operators, power plant managers) operating 
under their jurisdiction; it may also stimulate efforts on the part of 
those expecting their interests to be adversely affected by the operation of 
the regime to redefine some of its provisions. In some cases (e.g. the whaling 
regime or the vessel-source oil pollution regime), operationalization involves 
setting up international organizations to take charge of implementation 
review procedures, to make periodic decisions about the operation of the 
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regime, to handle financial matters and to deal with various administrative 
issues. 
It appears, at this point, that the relevance of the different processes of 
regime formation varies from one of these stages to another. Again and 
again, issues requiring the creation of international regimes are defined and 
developed conceptually in the absence of any explicit process. As the recent 
shift from single-species perspectives to whole ecosystems thinking suggests, 
this phase of the process is apt to reflect broader developments in the 
intellectual capital available to deal with such concerns. Similarly, there are 
severe constraints on the usefulness of imposition as a means of compelling 
individual states to act vigorously during the operationalization stage of 
regime formation. As recent experiences with issues like transboundary air 
pollution and deforestation make clear, in fact, powerful states sometimes 
find that they can make more progress through measures to build capacity 
and otherwise assist weaker states in their efforts to implement the terms of 
international regimes than they can through threats or sanctions intended to 
force weaker states to comply with the terms of international regimes. 
3. 4 Driving Social Forces 
Much of the energy of those interested in regime formation has gone into 
efforts to identify specific factors that play a causal role in the process of 
institutional development and to assess the relative importance of these 
factors in actual cases (Haggard and Simmons, 1987). Three clusters of 
factors have emerged as the primary claimants for the attention of those 
concerned with regime formation: power, knowledge and interests. Realists 
and many neorealists view agreements setting forth the terms of inter-
national regimes as reflections of the distribution of power in the material 
sense (Strange, 1983). Regimes can therefore be expected to change from 
time to time in the wake of shifts in the distribution of structural power in 
international society. Those who stress the role of ideas often treat 
knowledge as a form of power that is distinct from structural power. They 
emphasize the role of consensual knowledge and social learning in the 
processes giving rise to international regimes (E. Haas, 1990). In extreme 
cases, institutional arrangements may be expressions of hegemony in the 
Gramscian or ideational sense (Cox, 1983). 
Analysts stressing the role of interests look to interactive decision-making 
and the search for solutions to collective-action problems as the motivating 
force underlying regime formation (Young, l 989a; Zurn, 1992 ). Basing 
their arguments on models of interactive decision-making, many regime 
analysts have focused on problem structures and interest constellations as 
determinants of success in efforts to solve collective-action problems. The 
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game-theoretically inclined, for example, have drawn a distinction between 
coordination problems (for example, battle of the sexes) in which there are 
stable equilibria and collaboration problems (for instance, prisoner's 
dilemma or chicken) in which equilibria are either suboptimal or absent 
(Stein, 1983; Martin, 1992). Whereas incentives to cheat and, therefore, 
concerns about the development of compliance mechanisms constitute a 
central concern in dealing with collaboration problems, there is much less 
need to worry about such matters in coming to terms with coordination 
problems. Others have focused on measures of the severity or intensity of 
conflicts of interest among interactive decision-makers - the idea of a 
spectrum ranging from pure cooperation to pure or zero-sum conflict is 
popular in such analyses - and argued that the intensity of conflicts of 
interest or the 'malignness' of problems is an important determinant not 
only of success in efforts to create institutions but also of the effectiveness of 
institutions once they are in place (Wettestad and Andresen, 1991). It is 
important to distinguish, on this account, between types of conflicts such as 
conflicts about values, which are the most difficult to solve, and conflicts 
about absolutely assessed goods, which are relatively easy to solve 
(Rittberger and Zurn, 1990). 
Empirical work on regime formation has produced a number of notable 
conclusions about the role of these clusters of factors. Recent studies have 
provided little support for the theory of hegemonic stability, which stresses 
the role of dominant states in the process of regime formation and which has 
loomed for some time as a central concern of those who focus on power 
factors (Keohane, 1984; Rittberger, 1990; Young and Osherenko, 1993). 
Yet this does not mean that the role of power more generally is unimportant 
in the process of regime formation . It is worth considering a variety of other 
power-based arguments, such as the idea that some rough parity among the 
participants is important, in moving beyond the increasingly sterile debate 
about hegemony. Research on the role of ideas has focused recently on 
arguments pertaining to social learning and to the role of epistemic 
communities, construed as transnational groups of scientists and policy-
makers who become carriers and transmitters of ways of thinking about 
international problems and their solutions (Haas, 1992). Studies of actual 
cases have made it clear that these arguments will require considerably more 
development in analytic terms before they can be properly tested as 
contributions to our understanding of regime formation. One line of work 
on interest-based arguments is now centered on the idea of institutional 
bargaining, a form of bargaining featuring efforts to arrive at consensus on 
the terms of institutional arrangements under conditions of imperfect 
information about the payoff possibility set (Young, 1989b ). These studies 
stress the importance of integrative as well as distributive bargaining and 
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suggest that the image of 'life on the Pareto frontier' (Krasner, 1991) is a 
misleading one, at least when it comes to regime formation. Stressing the 
creative role of institutional bargaining, this way of thinking raises questions 
about the arguments many observers have made concerning the significance 
of problem structure as determinants of regime formation (Rittberger, 
1990). 
3.5 Cross-Cutting Factors 
Efforts to sort out the relative importance of power, knowledge and interests 
through an examination of actual cases have revealed the significance of two 
additional factors that cut across the three original clusters: individual 
leadership and context. Careful reconstructions of the creation stories of 
specific ·regimes regularly point to the roles prominent individuals play at 
critical junctures in the formation processes (Young and Osherenko, 1993). 
In this connection, it is helpful to distinguish three types of leadership that 
parallel the driving social forces described in the preceding paragraphs 
(Young, 199la). Structural leaders are individuals who represent states and 
devise stratagems for bringing power in the material or structural sense to 
bear on processes of regime formation. Intellectual leaders, by contrast, 
develop and exploit ideas to shape the way issues are framed and to energize 
the occurrence of social learning during formation processes. For their part, 
entrepreneurial leaders endeavor to highlight the integrative aspect of 
institutional bargaining, to craft new options capable of producing con-
sensus, and to broker deals that lead to closure on the terms of 
constitutional contracts. Different types of leadership are apt to loom large 
in one or another of the stages of regime formation . Whereas intellectual 
leadership is particularly prominent at the agenda formation stage, entrepre-
neurial leadership is more important at the stage of institutional choice. But 
in virtually every case of successful regime formation, one or more key 
individuals have provided leadership at crucial turning-points. 
The process of creating international regimes does not occur in a vacuum. 
Rather, this process unfolds in a setting in which any number of other issues 
can intrude to promote or impede the creation process. The outbreak of 
World War I in 1914, for example, terminated efforts to craft an 
international regime for the Svalbard Archipelago for a period of six years 
and ushered in a political setting in which the regime finally created in 1920 
was radically different from the proposals on the table in 1914 (Singh and 
Saguirian, 199 3) . The initiation of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process in the 1970s and the desire on the 
part of the Soviet Union to convey a spirit of cooperation in this connection, 
by contrast, provided the impetus to reach agreement on the terms of a 
285 
Marc A. Levy et al. 
number of institutional arrangements. These include the Geneva Conven-
tion of 1979 setting forth initial provisions of a regime for long-range 
transboundary air pollution (Soroos, 1993), an arrangement which has 
subsequently evolved into a complex institution with considerable impact on 
the behavior of some of its members (Levy, 1993a). Because they are not 
connected with processes of regime formation in any substantive sense, the 
role these contextual or idiosyncratic factors play in specific cases is difficult 
to anticipate. Yet they can have drastic effects on regime creation, a fact that 
means we must be on the lookout for them at all times. 
3.6 Multivariate Models 
The challenge before us now is to move beyond efforts to single out 
individual factors as the key to regime formation in international society 
(Young and Osherenko, 1993; Efinger et al ., 1993). In part, this endeavor 
must involve a recognition of the role of equifinality in the formation of 
international regimes or, in other words, the existence of multiple tracks 
along which such processes can move toward the same end (or equivalent 
ends). It is no doubt true that there are cases in which a dominant state or 
a hegemon supplies institutional arrangements to the members of a 
privileged group as a kind of public good. But there are many cases in which 
regime formation takes the form of a bargaining process among actors or 
coalitions that are more nearly equals. Similarly, while integrative bargaining 
and social learning loom large in some cases, other cases appear to be better 
understood in terms of the striking of deals among actors possessing a clear 
sense of the contours of the payoff space or the negotiation set associated 
with the institutional options available to them. The importance of 
equifinality indicates that we should not be overly concerned with the search 
for necessary conditions for success in the process of regime formation, a 
search that is likely to prove frustrating and relatively fruitless. Yet there is 
nothing in this realization to prevent us from identifying a number of tracks 
that successful processes of regime formation can follow - such as provision 
on the part of a single dominant actor or action on the part of a k group or 
small number of leading actors (Schelling, 1978) - and from spelling out 
the sorts of cases that are likely to proceed along each of these tracks. 
Equally important is the need to acknowledge that the distinctions laid 
out in the preceding sections are analytic in character and that interaction 
effects between and among them are the rule rather than the exception. 
Institutional bargaining, for example, often leads to a recasting of the nature 
of the problem under consideration; efforts to operationalize the terms of 
constitutional contracts frequently trigger a reconsideration of provisions 
accepted at an earlier stage or a move to augment or extend the provisions 
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set forth in an initial agreement. Knowledge can produce new technologies 
that alter the relative bargaining power of those engaged in processes of 
regime formation . Yet power in the material sense sometimes allows its 
possessors to maintain and even increase their access to superior knowledge. 
These subtleties should not be allowed to derail efforts to construct 
generalizations that can help us to identify patterns in complex processes of 
regime formation . But they do emphasize the value of careful efforts to 
reconstruct the creation stories of individual regimes through procedures 
like process tracing and thick description. The challenge before us in 
improving our understanding of regime formation, then, is to delve into the 
subtleties of these interaction effects as they unfold in individual cases, 
without losing track of the importance of identifying patterns that can 
sustain useful generalizations about the creation of international regimes. 
4. Do Regimes Make a Difference? 
Early regime analysis focused on identifying the conditions under which 
international regimes form . Not surprisingly, skeptics branded this an 
irrelevant exercise, since it failed to address the question of whether regimes 
matter, in other words, whether they are more than epiphenomena! in 
relation to underlying social forces. The neorealists, in particular, regard 
institutionalized cooperation as a reflection of the distribution of structural 
power, implying that specific regimes will be abandoned when the under-
lying power distribution changes or when institutional commitments 
become inconvenient to one or more powerful member states. On this 
account, it is wasteful at best to devote resources to the analysis of 
institutionalized cooperation in world politics . At worst, it may prove 
seriously misleading. 
There are two ways to meet this challenge and, in the process, 
demonstrate that regimes do make a difference. We can show that once 
established, regimes display a persistence or robustness that cannot be 
explained fully in terms of the conditions under which they formed in the 
first place . In a sense, this is a negative proof of the importance of 
international institutions. The positive proof goes one step further and aims 
at pinpointing specific ways in which regimes make a difference. Although 
this second strategy is methodologically more complicated, it is of great 
practical relevance and has become the focus of much of the current research 
on international regimes (see Section 5 below). In this section, we report 
briefly on the research that established the idea that regimes are more than 
mere epiphenomena. 
287 
Marc A. Levy et al. 
4.1 Changes in Power Distribution 
Many observers have cited the formation of the GATT regime to regulate 
international trade as a clear illustration of the dynamic emphasized by the 
theory of hegemonic stability. The United States, which was clearly the 
dominant state in economic terms during the 1940s, took the lead in 
building this fundamental element of the postwar world order. Since the 
1970s, however, America's economic dominance has declined, and the 
Japanese and European economies have caught up. Yet the global economic 
crises of the late 1970s and the early 1990s did not destroy the GATT 
regime. There have been modifications and adaptations of the GATT rules as 
well as some discordant actions. But these economic crises have not 
triggered competitive devaluations or wholesale protectionism. Robert 
Keohane has used this finding of 'cooperation after hegemony' to probe the 
functions of existing regimes. These functions entail, above all, reductions in 
uncertainty and insecurity. Thus, regimes ( 1) stabilize mutual expectations 
regarding future behavior, (2) reduce transaction costs, (3) produce 
information otherwise not available or available only at high cost and ( 4) 
provide a frame of reference that ensures that the interaction repeats itself 
frequently enough to generate a long 'shadow of the future' (Keohane, 
1984: Ch. 7). Given stable constellations of interests and distributions of 
capacity, international regimes improve the contractual environment and 
thus stabilize cooperation, even if the conditions under which the regime 
came into existence no longer hold. Whereas regime-building may be 
difficult, the maintenance of regimes may prove easier. Thus, 'the high costs 
of regime building help existing regimes to persist' (Lynn-Jones, 1988: 
498-9). 
4.2 Changes in Overall Relations 
If international regimes for specific issue areas perform their prescribed 
functions, they are likely to persist even when confronted with a deteriora-
tion of overall relations among the participants . Since deteriorating overall 
relations raise uncertainty about the motivations and future behavior of 
other actors, cooperation in issue areas not governed by the presence of 
regimes is likely to vanish as a consequence of such changes. In issue areas 
featuring stable regimes, however, meeting such challenges should pose 
fewer problems. This hypothesis is clearly corroborated by evidence from the 
study of East-West regimes (Rittberger and Zurn, 1990). Regimes estab-
lished before the deterioration of overall East-West relations between 1979 
and 1984 proved robust. The Baltic environmental protection regime, for 
example, was not affected at all by the worsening of East-West relations; 
none of the meetings of the consultative committees was canceled and the 
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general problem-solving approach espoused by the participants remained 
unchanged. Similarly, the rules for managing conflicts in the issue area of 
Berlin, which had been highly contested for almost 30 years, remained fully 
operational. The inter-German trade regime also displayed resilience in the 
face of deteriorating overall relations. Pertinent analyses of other issue areas 
in East-West relations involving modes of conflict management approxi-
mating what we call regimes yield similar results . Neither the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime nor the incidents-at-sea regime was seriously 
affected by the deterioration of East-West relations beginning in the late 
1970s. This robustness of East-West regimes seems even more remarkable 
when we compare issue areas in which conflict management did not cross 
the threshold of regime formation . In the cases of working conditions of 
foreign journalists and confidence- and security-building measures in 
·Europe, the period between 1979 and 1984 had unambiguously negative 
impacts. 
4.3 Inconvenient Commitments 
Some analysts have suggested that regime persistence is best demonstrated 
through close observation of their influence on the decisions of individual 
governments, especially in cases where compliance with regime rules seems 
inconvenient. Pursuing this idea, Harald Muller ( l 993b) studied the role of 
the anti-ballistic missile treaty, construed as a component of the strategic 
nuclear weapons control regime, in American decision-making regarding 
strategic defense and Soviet decision-making regarding the illegal con-
struction of an early-warning radar system at Krasnoyarsk. In both cases, 
influential civilian or military agencies ·sought to implement policies that 
violated the provisions of the regime . In each case, the regime proved to be 
a critical resource for those opposed to these policies. Concern that non-
compliance would endanger the regime mobilized the resistance of those 
who believed the maintenance of the regime to be in the national interest. In 
addition, Muller shows that the regime itself - through its connection with 
international and domestic laws as well as through the foreseeable effects of 
defection on a state's international reputation - served as an important 
barrier to non-compliance. 
4.4 Unsatisjjing Outcomes 
Another type of challenge to the persistence of international regimes arises in 
cases of apparent failure to solve problems. Studies of the ozone regime, the 
Mediterranean Action Plan and the Baltic Sea regime have shown that the 
initial institutional response to the problem at hand was grossly inadequate. 
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But in each case, the creation of the regime initiated an institutional dynamic 
leading to a progressive adaptation of regime rules based on new knowledge 
about the nature of the problem. These 'evolutionary' (List, 1991) or 
'dynamic' (Gehring, 1994) processes did not evaporate in the face of 
evidence of poor performance. Rather, the regimes became increasingly 
effective and robust through a process of internally generated reform. In his 
study of the Mediterranean Action Plan, for example, Peter Haas (1990) 
provides a detailed account of the ways in which activities initiated by 
regimes give rise to such evolutionary processes. 
Once established, then, international regimes often prove robust when 
confronted with challenges stemming from changes in the perceived benefits 
and costs ofliving up to commitments, the distribution of power among the 
participants, or the overall relationship of the parties. If a regime seems too 
weak as initially constituted to achieve its institutional goals, moreover, this 
may trigger a dynamic leading to a strengthening of the regime itself. This 
does not mean, of course, that international regimes are eternal. A 
fundamental transformation in the domestic political system of a major 
member state leading to far-reaching changes in that party's international 
interests, for example, can cause the failure of international institutions. 
Thus, Nazi Germany abandoned almost all the institutional commitments of 
the Weimar Republic in order to build new ones with the Axis powers and 
various states in Southeastern Europe. If some of the world's major 
economic powers were to embrace a strategy of economic autarky, this 
development would undoubtedly endanger today's GAIT regime. 12 Sim-
ilarly, regimes may be unable to survive the disappearance of key members . 
None of the regimes regulating German-German relations, for example, 
remains in place today, and many regimes regulating East-West relations are 
in transition. 13 We know far less about processes of regime decline or decay 
than about the factors governing persistence of regimes in the face of 
changing circumstances. Studies of regime decay, moreover, should prove 
rewarding not only as ends in themselves but also as sources of insights 
regarding regime persistence . 
5. Regime Consequences: Effectiveness 
How exactly do international institutions operate to help society manage 
international problems? How much of the variance in problem-solving at the 
international level can we reasonably attribute to the operation of institu-
tional arrangements in contrast to other forces at work in international 
society? Although the last decade has witnessed a striking growth of interest 
in international regimes, we remain unable to frame convincing answers to 
these central questions. For the most part, the answers proposed by those 
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possessing extensive knowledge of individual regimes have failed to general-
ize to other cases. At the same time, the efforts of those seeking to compare 
and contrast a variety of regimes in these terms have encountered a number 
of problems concerning the drawing of causal inferences. This section 
reviews the evidence accumulated so far concerning the consequences of 
regimes. We have organized this effort under the rubric of effectiveness, 
because this concept directs attention to the consequences of international 
institutions having the most direct connection to the outcomes deemed 
desirable by the actors who create them. Regimes can have consequences 
that do not fit under the heading of effectiveness; some of these are 
discussed in the following section. 
5.1 Ihe Meaning of Effectiveness 
Broadly speaking, effectiveness has to do with the contributions institutions 
make to solving the problems that motivate actors to create them. On 
further examination, however, effectiveness emerges as an elusive concept 
construed quite differently by various analysts. The significance of these 
differences lies in the fact that each meaning requires analysts to make a 
different combination of difficult normative, scientific and historical 
judgments. 
International regimes commonly emerge in response to particular 
problems - environmental deterioration, escalating tariffs, border conflicts. 
In the final analysis, therefore, effectiveness is a matter of the degree to 
which a regime ameliorates the problem that prompted its creation. Is 
environmental quality improving, are tariffs falling, are border clashes 
declining? Yet this definition presents practical difficulties that are sometimes 
severe. The social systems that are the focus of international regimes are 
typically complicated and subject to complex fluctuations. It is therefore 
difficult, under the best of circumstances, to ascribe observed changes to the 
operation of specific international rules. This difficulty is compounded by 
the fact that most problems serious enough to justify the creation of an 
international regime motivate actors to pursue solutions through a variety of 
means, including some that do not involve the regime directly. What looks 
like an effective regime, in terms of problem-solving, therefore, may be only 
an irrelevant side-show. Accordingly, the concept of problem-solving, which 
is appealing in directing our attention to the substantive bottom line, can 
become the source of its own limitations because it is so hard to apply 
meaningfully. 
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that students of regimes have 
turned to a variety of other approaches to elucidating the meaning of 
effectiveness. A legal definition of effectiveness holds that the measure of 
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success is the degree to which conflicts become regulated by the rule of law 
(commonly reflected in contractual obligations), and to the extent to which 
contractual obligations are met - substantive provisions are implemented, 
rules are complied with, policies are adopted, and so on. In contrast to 
problem-solving, this view provides a more straightforward approach to 
measurement. But this operational clarity comes at a price, both because this 
approach ignores non-contractual consequences of regimes and because 
implementation and compliance tell us little about problem-solving. A more 
applied or policy-oriented definition, which appeals to many economists as 
well as practitioners, focuses on well-defined goals and asks what policy 
adjustments will prove effective in attaining these goals. This leads to 
interesting debates about such matters as the relative efficiency of command-
and-control regulations and tradable permits as means of achieving targets 
specified by a regime. But it does not provide a basis for generalizing about 
the overall causal significance of institutions in addressing international 
problems. For its part, a political definition conceives of the problems 
regimes confront as a function of specific constellations of actors, interests 
and interactive relationships; it directs attention to behavior and behavioral 
change. Effective regimes cause changes in the behavior of actors and in 
patterns of interactions among them in ways that contribute to management 
of targeted problems. The primary strength of this approach is its firm 
connection to the real world through its emphasis on observable behavior. 
Among its drawbacks, on the other hand, are a tendency to lose sight of 
the objectives regimes are established to achieve and to slight policy 
concerns. 
What are the implications of these definitional complications? If every 
scholar insisted on the prior development of a logically concise and easily 
operationalized definition of effectiveness, little research would get done. If 
we collectively insisted on the development of a common definition, there 
would be none at all. At this stage, there is room for a number of research 
strategies, some of which employ different definitions of effectiveness. What 
is essential in this connection is to state definitions explicitly, so that 
differences in both analytical and empirical findings can be debated 
meaningfully instead of getting confused with mere terminological differ-
ences. In the process, we should learn whether the use of different 
definitions of effectiveness leads to substantial divergences in judgments 
regarding the level of effectiveness achieved by individual regimes. In the 
review that follows, therefore, we seek to include relevant bodies of 
evidence, regardless of the particular definitions of effectiveness they 
employ. 
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5.2 The Domain of Effectiveness 
We can differentiate regime consequences along at least three distinct 
dimensions: ( 1) direct vs . indirect effects, (2) internal vs. external effects and 
( 3) positive vs. negative effects . 
In essence, the question of whether a regime's effects are direct or indirect 
is a matter of the length of the causal chain connecting the regime to the 
behavior in question. Direct effects are linked by short causal chains, indirect 
effects by longer ones . Generally speaking, it is easier to trace direct effects 
than indirect effects, although Miles (1989) found that many regimes 
produce greater effects through indirect means than direct means. Regimes 
commonly produce effects outside the issue areas that constitute their 
primary concerns. Such external effects can be caused by physical and 
biological linkages (e.g. when success in restoring one species leads to· 
increased pressure on other species). They may also take the form of 
demonstration or other cognitive effects. Although the distinction between 
positive and negative effects is straightforward analytically, it requires 
difficult judgments in practice. What looks like progress to one analyst may 
represent a 'local maximum' that actually detracts from the achievement of 
an optimal solution. 14 Though there are exceptions, most research on the 
effectiveness of international regimes focuses on direct and positive effects 
within a given issue area. 
5.3 Causal Bases of Effectiveness 
All the definitions of effectiveness imply some causal connection between the 
institution and the relevant behavioral changes. As J0rgen Wettestad and 
Steinar Andresen ( 1991) have pointed out, the real measure of a regime's 
effectiveness involves a comparison with what would have happened if the 
regime had never existed. This requires a demonstration of the causal links 
between the operation of the institution and the behavior of the relevant 
actors. 15 A regime that fares poorly in terms of simple before-and-after 
comparisons may look more successful when causal links and counter-
factuals are taken into account. GATT, for example, may seem relatively 
ineffective if we look only at the slow progress toward the removal of non-
tariff barriers over the past 20-years. Yet it appears considerably more 
effective when we ask what the pattern of international trade would have 
been during that period without GATT. 
Scholars have employed a number of analytical techniques to sort out the 
true effects of international regimes from mere correlations that do not 
reflect causal links. We can group these techniques, which should be treated 
as a set of tools to be used in conjunction with one another, into two broad 
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categories: natural experiments and thought experiments (Levy and Young, 
1993). 
The facts that we cannot conduct laboratory experiments involving 
international regimes and that the number of truly comparable cases is 
normally too small to allow for the use of standard statistical procedures 
clearly put us at a disadvantage in efforts to measure effectiveness. We face a 
problem much like that confronting those who seek to understand major 
episodes of biological extinctions or significant changes in the earth's climate 
system. But as these comparisons suggest, there are techniques of analysis 
that can help us to deal with this problem. We can make use of natural or 
quasi-experiments (Campbell and Stanley, 1966) by exploring comparisons 
across different issues areas or over time within a single evolving regime in 
such a way as to take advantage of variation on the independent variable. 
This involves examining situations that are comparable except for the 
presence or absence of a regime (or particular type of regime) or situations 
that remain largely unchanged over time except for alterations in the 
character of the prevailing regime. The case of oil pollution before and after 
the introduction of equipment standards (Mitchell, 1994b) is a case in 
point. If the two distinct institutional configurations correspond closely with 
observable differences in outcomes, we can infer that there is a good chance 
that these differences are attributable to the institutional variable. Given the 
nature of such experiments, it is important not to overestimate the 
significance of the inferences drawn. Observed differences in outcomes may 
well be results of concomitant but unnoticed variations across our cases in 
factors other than the institutional variable. Nonetheless, this is an exercise 
well worth pursuing as one means of separating institutional effects from the 
causal forces invoked in various rival hypotheses. 
To complement the findings derivable from natural experiments, we can 
also make use of thought experiments. Specifically, students of regimes have 
turned to what has become known in the recent international relations 
literature as the method of counter-factuals (Fearon, 1991; Biersteker, 
1993). In effect, this technique involves a rigorous effort to recontruct the 
flow of events as it would have unfolded in the absence of some key factor 
(e.g. the introduction of a particular regime or social practice) and to 
compare the results with the actual flow of events. What would have 
happened, for example, if those responsible for the oil pollution regime had 
not shifted from discharge standards to equipment standards? Similarly, how 
would the problem of trans boundary air pollution in Europe have evolved if 
the players had not seized the opportunity afforded by the initiation of the 
CSCE process and the lull in the Cold War to reach agreement on the terms 
of the Geneva Convention of 1979? Clearly, this sort of analysis can become 
sloppy and lose its value in the hands of careless analysts . The keys to success 
294 
The Study of International Regimes 
in such endeavors involve framing counter-factuals as precisely as possible 
and delving deeply into behavior of key actors at critical junctures. This 
means looking at decision-making processes within regime members, 
focusing on important branching points where events might have taken a 
different course, and asking what path would have been followed if the 
regime had not existed. Terms like process tracing and thick description 
( Geertz, 1973) are often used to characterize this method of probing the 
causal links between regimes and their effects. 
Although no single procedure can be expected to yield definitive proof, 
applying this set of analytical techniques to a growing collection of 
international regimes offers the prospect of building up an increasingly 
well-defined picture of the role of institutions as determinants of collective 
outcomes in international society. This effort is unlikely to yield dramatic . 
conclusions to the effect that institutions are always critical determinants of 
outcomes or, conversely, that institutions never matter. Rather, we can 
expect to move toward more realistic and interesting conclusions by 
identifying conditions that determine when regimes matter and the extent to 
which these arrangements matter in a variety of social settings that are typical 
of international society. 
5.4 Review of Hypotheses and Evidence16 
We turn now to an appraisal of the state of empirical knowledge about what 
makes international regimes more or less effective. This involves a review of 
three bodies ofliterature: ( 1) work emphasizing exogenous factors or factors 
external to institutions, (2) work looking to endogenous or internal sources 
of effectiveness and ( 3) work seeking to identify behavioral mechanisms 
linking institutional characteristics with collective outcomes. 
Exogenous Factor. Much of the scholarly interest in regime effectiveness has 
focused on exogenous factors. In this account, we separate out the following 
clusters of factors; the pattern of interests in the relevant issue area, the 
distribution of influence among the participants and the role of structural 
constraints (e .g. the capacity to monitor behavior, the state of scientific 
knowledge or the occurrence of shocks and crises). 
Patterns oflnterests: The behavioral changes international regimes seek to 
promote almost always have negative consequences for some sets of 
interests: power plants are asked to install sulfur dioxide scrubbers to reduce 
acid rain, protected manufacturers have to compete with lower tariffs . It is 
possible that some interests will be positively affected as well . Owners of 
commercial timber stocks will benefit from reductions in acid rain; 
consumers and exporters benefit from lower tariffs. 
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The configuration of negatively and positively affected interests constrains 
the ability of international institutions to affect behavior. Many accounts of 
the early phases of the European acid rain case, for example, stressed the 
distribution of interests as imposing an overwhelming constraint on the 
ability of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(LRTAP) to bring about behavioral changes. A few low-pollution states 
suffered the bulk of the damage from acid rain, whereas high-pollution 
states either suffered little damage (e.g. Britain) or had no interest in 
preventing such damage (e.g. Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany). Even 
though this factor has received sustained attention in the analysis of regime 
formation, however, it has lurked in the shadows of the effectiveness debate 
(Kay and Jacobson, 1983). Nonetheless, in case studies of the effectiveness 
of individual regimes, the distribution of interests consistently emerges as an 
important factor. 
Distribution of Influence: Another line of inquiry examines how the 
distribution of influence among the participants affects the ability of an 
institution to succeed at its task. There are debates over what types of 
distribution and what types of influence promote effectiveness. As with the 
claims made about the impact of interests, most discussions of this factor 
have taken the form of ad hoc claims made with respect to specific 
institutions; there has been less sustained effort aimed at uncovering general 
causal relationships. 
The distribution of coercive power appears to affect an institution's ability 
to bring about behavioral changes. American fishing quotas in its exclusive 
economic zone provided a power resource used to promote compliance with 
International Whaling Commission (IWC) quotas (Andresen, 1989; Peter-
son, 1992). American oil imports, combined with a threat to impose 
unilateral regulations on tankers entering its ports, gave the United States 
influence that led to tightening MARPOL (International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships) standards (M'Gonigle and Zacher, 
1979). Clearly, coercive power by itself is no guarantee of success; it must be 
concentrated among proponents of institutional objectives. According to 
one strand of hegemonic stability theory, a concentration of coercive power 
in a state that supports institutional goals is virtually a necessary condition 
for institutional success (Gilpin, 1987) . This conclusion is based on the 
argument that in situations characterized by mixed motives (in which actors 
have an interest in collective restraint but also would like to shirk and let 
others bear the burden), an enforcer is required to prevent 'free-riding' . 
Another strand of theorizing also concludes that a concentration of 
influence is required for institutions to be effective, but focuses on less 
coercive forms of influence. Accordingly, individual leadership is a necessary 
condition for institutional success (Young and Osherenko, 1993). Such 
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leadership might take the form of political entrepreneurship or intellectual 
persuasion as well as efforts to bring structural power to bear on a problem. 
The conclusion that leadership is necessary is based in part on the deductive 
argument that institutional success requires a cementing of complex bargains 
that states, left to their own devices, will be unable to realize. It is based also 
on empirical work that every successful case of regime creation studied in the 
project featured a pivotal role for leadership. 
Peter Haas has focused attention on one particular form of non-coercive 
influence featuring the role of 'epistemic communities'. In a comparative 
study of efforts to protect regional seas, which builds on his study of the 
Mediterranean Action Plan, Haas ( 1992) finds that the following conditions 
have prevailed in most successful regional seas efforts: ( 1) the presence of a 
regional community of able marine scientists interested in environmental 
management, (2) 'Respect by political decision makers for the authority and 
expertise of these scientists' and ( 3) the existence of channels of contact or 
influence between the scientific community and national policy-makers. 
A related argument points to the distribution of capacity as a factor 
effecting the success of regimes. Some institutions seek adjustment on the 
part of actors who simply lack the capacity to make the necessary changes. 
States with weak administrative and legal institutions often cannot comply 
with an institution's directives, even when they have an interest in doing so. 
Institutions with large numbers of low-capacity states as members will tend 
to fail more often than institutions seeking to influence the behavior ofhigh-
capacity states. Monetary agreements often break down, for example, when 
they require actions that are beyond the capacity of central banks. Putnam's 
(1988) 'involuntary defection' constitutes a clear example of capacity-driven 
failure. 
Nature of the Issue Area: Finally, some institutions may do better than 
others because they operate in a relatively benign issue area. Some 
international problems, for example, are marked by unambiguous shocks 
and crises; others sneak up on relevant actors and do not galvanize them into 
action until it is too late. The case of regulating oil tankers reveals what can 
happen when lots of shocks and crises occur. Successful regulatory action 
began as early as 1954, following massive oil slicks on British beaches; a 
series of tanker accidents since then has helped maintain pressure that has 
been translated into a steady tightening of rules governing safety and 
operational standards of tankers. It is hard to imagine MARPOL evolving in 
this direction in the absence of these high-visibility shocks. The publicization 
of Waldsterben in 1981-2 and the ozone hole in 1985-6 also appear to have 
boosted the effectiveness of the regimes established to deal with acid rain 
and ozone depletion. Other problems do not provide such early warnings, 
and institutions designed to address them have encountered greater barriers 
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to success. This is arguably the case with regard to most fisheries: time-lags 
often delay the emergence of crises until stocks have been drawn down so 
low that no effective institutional responses are available. A similar situation 
may explain the limited success of attempts to cope with the LDC debt 
crisis; the crisis became apparent to policy-makers after the problem had 
become highly intractable. 
Another factor that can influence effectiveness is the ability to monitor the 
behavior of relevant actors. Where such ability is high, actors will be more 
willing to engage in mutual self-restraint, knowing that they will be able to 
detect violations on the part of others and respond accordingly. Where 
monitoring is difficult or impossible, by contrast, actors will worry that they 
will be unable to detect violations and therefore be less willing to undertake 
measures due to a fear of being cheated. In such cases, actors willing to bring 
pressure to bear on violators will be unable to determine who deserves their 
wrath. Monitoring of international fisheries, for example, is especially 
problematic due to the highly fragmented nature of the industry and the fact 
that most actual harvesting occurs far out of sight. This may be an important 
factor in explaining why few fisheries regimes have succeeded in preserving 
the relevant stocks. 
Concluding Thoughts on Exogenous Factors: Scholars who emphasize 
exogenous factors as sources of institutional effectiveness must address a 
fundamental objection: if the exogenous forces seem so influential, how can 
we attribute a causal role to the institution? Many analysts fail to confront 
this question directly, and their claims suffer as a result. In theory, there is 
nothing incompatible with strong influence from exogenous forces and a 
positive role for institutions. Consider, for example, the effectiveness of post-
World War II economic arrangements as compared to the abortive attempts 
of the 1920s. Many accounts stress the greater interest in cooperation in the 
postwar period as the key factor. But this does not mean that the Bretton 
Woods institutions were unimportant. If an institution performs important 
functions that could not have been handled in its absence, then changed 
interests are insufficient to explain greater cooperation. Yet most treatments 
of cooperation that stress exogenous factors treat the relationship between 
exogenous factors and the roles institutions play sloppily, blurring the 
distinction between exogenous causes of behavior and exogenous con-
straints on the ability of institutions to influence behavior. Haas's list of 
exogenous 'preconditions' for effective regional seas regimes, for example, is 
the same as his list of UNEP's institutional objectives, a fact that makes it 
impossible to distinguish cases in which the institution made a difference 
from those in which it merely allowed external events to take their course. 
One way to avoid this pitfall is to present explicit causal arguments, 
specifying exactly what the initial conditions are, what the institutional 
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response and exogenous forces are, and how these factors interact causally to 
produce the observed outcome.17 
Endogenous Factors. The search for endogenous sources of effectiveness is 
based on the premise that there are good and bad ways of structuring 
international institutions as well as good and bad ways of administering these 
arrangements operationally. Getting the rules right, engaging energetic and 
creative secretariats, and initiating the right kinds of programmatic activities 
may be important determinants of effectiveness. Analytically, this means that 
we may be able to explain variation in institutional effectiveness in terms of 
variation in these endogenous features. All such efforts must tackle an age-
old source of criticism. It is possible that variation in endogenous features is 
perfectly correlated with variation in interests and power capabilities, so that 
these endogenous factors themselves carry no independent explanatory 
weight. Some institutions may be 'designed to fail' by actors who covertly 
want them to fail (Moe, 1991 ); others may be blessed with effective design 
features because powerful actors want them to succeed. In either case, the 
most persuasive explanation lies in the interests and power capabilities of the 
relevant actors; the endogenous features are derivative . One way to avoid 
this pitfall is to control for relevant exogenous variables before seeking 
differences in outcomes that correlate with differences in endogenous 
variables. These methodological problems notwithstanding, a number of 
analysts have formulated propositions about institutional effectiveness 
featuring factors endogenous to international regimes. In this account, we 
divide these into propositions concerning design features of international 
regimes and propositions about programmatic activities of regimes. 
Design Features: The view that an institution's origins shape its destiny is 
as old as politics itself. Ever since practitioners and theorists began arguing 
about proper forms of constitutions, they have acted on the premise that the 
design features embedded in political institutions affect the ability of those 
institutions to carry out the tasks assigned to them. From Plato's rumina-
tions on the best way to organize a city-state in order to make justice 
flourish, to Rousseau's ideas on what sorts of political organizations make 
freedom possible, to Madison's thoughts on how federal constitutions can 
prevent tyranny, and right on to recent debates over how to reform the 
European Union's institutions, we see a clear concern with institutional 
design features as important sources of effectiveness . 
Among recent students of institutions, Elinor Ostrom (1990) has most 
consistently and rigorously addressed questions of institutional design, 
though she has only recently turned her attention to international issues. 
McGinnis and Ostrom (1992) provide a set of 'design principles' that they 
claim contribute to the effectiveness of international institutions for the 
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management of common-pool resources . These principles point to factors 
endogenous to the institutions 'that help to account for the success of these 
institutions in sustaining the [common pool resources] and gaining the 
compliance of generation after generation of participants' (McGinnis and 
Ostrom, 1992: 2) . The specific design principles McGinnis and Ostrom 
propose are derived from a long-term study of domestic institutions 
established to manage common pool resources; these authors give plausible 
reasons for presuming that lessons drawn from a study of domestic 
institutions will prove relevant to international regimes, though they do 
not subject this view to the same level of rigorous testing that Ostrom 
has carried out for domestic institutions. The basis of their conclusions 
is therefore a mixture of rigorous testing (at the level of proposition-
generation) and theoretical conjecture (at the level of proposition-testing) . 
McGinnis and Ostrom summarize their principles for institutional success as 
follows: 
• Rights to utilize resources are clearly defined, as are the boundaries of 
the resource in question. 
• Rules match local circumstances. 
• Individuals affected by operational rules have an opportunity to 
participate in modifying the rules . 
• Monitoring of resource health and participant behavior is conducted by 
agents accountable to the participants. 
• Violators are subject to graduated sanctions. 
• Participants have access to low-cost arenas of conflict resolution. 
• The rights of participants to devise their own institutions are not 
challenged by other authorities . 
• Institutional activity is organized in multiple, nested layers. 
Few, if any, of these design principles have been explored systematically 
across a range of international regimes; they remain hypotheses in need of 
testing. An empirical study recently completed by Abram Chayes and 
Antonia Cha yes ( 1993, 1995) reports interim results that confirm these 
ideas only partially. Chayes and Chayes support the importance of the first 
principle, concluding that many cases of non-compliance stem from 
'ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language' (Chayes and Chayes, 
1993: 188-9). However, they find that international institutions virtually 
never utilize sanctions to achieve their goals. Conflict resolution mechanisms 
are sometimes important sources of compliance, they find, but in many cases 
they amount to boilerplate arrangements with little political effect. 
Other analysts have produced independent assessments of design features. 
Ronald Mitchell (1994a) examines efforts to reduce operational discharges 
of oil from tankers and reaches several conclusions about ways in which 
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endogenous features of international institutions shape their effectiveness. 
He finds, for example, that rules aimed at ship builders have been more 
effective than rules aimed at ship operators, and he draws the general lesson 
that rules are more effective when they target actors who have the greatest 
incentive to comply. (In a sense, this is a specific manifestation of the second 
principle of McGinnis and Ostrom.) 
Peter Sand (1990) has formulated yet another set of design options, 
which he claims promote effective institutional responses to environmental 
problems. These include: 
• Allowing for interim operation, before entry-into-force . 
• Utilizing soft-law to promote action when binding rules are politically 
impossi~le . 
• Delegating decision-making power to a specialized body. 
• Setting standards at a regional rather than the global level. 
• Providing selective incentives, including technology and finances . 
• Setting differential obligations, rather than common standards (see also 
Parson and Zeckhauser, forthcoming) . 
• Conducting regular reviews of institutional performance (also see Lee, 
1993). 
Sand offers trenchant illustrations for each of his propositions. From the 
perspective of political science, however, they also remain hypotheses in need 
of testing rather than empirically tested propositions. They require analysis 
involving behavior rather than law, and this means detailed case studies 
including some comparative studies of cases in which institutions with such 
provisions are compared to regimes without them. 
The need to focus on behavior is critical, because we must ultimately 
change the behavior of actors to solve international problems. It is possible 
that wily political actors will respond to improved legal rules with evasive 
behavioral action, leaving the underlying problem unsolved. The Inter-
national Maritime Organization (IMO), for example, adopted in 1973 a 
change in rules governing amendments to MARPOL that took effect in 
1983 . Rather than requiring formal ratification in each case, amendments 
now enter into force automatically after 16 months, unless more than one-
third of the parties representing more than 50% of world shipping tonnage 
issue objections. This has had the effect of generating improved law: 
amendments enter into force quickly, rather than suffering from the problem 
of being held hostage for years to states that withhold ratification - often 
amendments would not enter into force until after they were made obsolete 
by newer amendments (Mitchell, 1993). Yet it is not clear that this has had 
any effect at all on state behavior. A comparison of amendments to 
MARPOL before and after the changed entry-into-force procedure suggests 
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that states have responded to the new procedure by passing nothing but very 
weak amendments (Underdal, 1992). 
A number of authors interested in effectiveness have emphasized the 
importance of the ways in which scientific and technical advice is institution-
alized. Edward A. Parson has found that the design of the Montreal 
Protocol's scientific and technical committees fostered the development of 
productive scientific consensus and creative problem-solving, and lowered 
political posturing. Specifically, the constitution of these bodies as non-
governmental entities has helped ensure that only qualified experts serve and 
that they do so in the name of their disciplines rather than their governments 
(Parson, 1993). Other studies emphasizing the organization of scientific advice 
in determining the effectiveness of institutional arrangements include works 
by Ernst Haas (1990), Peter Haas (1989) and Edward Miles (1989). All these 
analysts argue that effective institutional responses require organizational 
designs giving agenda-setting power to individuals who share a common, 
scientific approach to knowledge and problem-solving. Boehmer-Christiansen 
( 1989), on the other hand, offers a more skeptical view on this topic. 
Programmatic Activities: To be effective institutions may require not only 
the right beginnings, but also a well-constructed set of programmatic 
activities. Kay and Jacobson (1983: 'Conclusion') list a number of opera-
tional factors that contribute to organizational success: recognizing and 
nurturing competence, emergence of dynamic leadership, ability to perform 
basic organizational tasks (e.g. typing, translation) and imagination and 
creativity. All of these are factors endogenous to institutions yet not 
determined by their constitution. They reflect the choices actors make and 
the actions they take within the framework of existing institutions. 
Mitchell has found that compliance with reporting requirements improves 
greatly when secretariats submit questionnaires prompting specific govern-
ment officials to provide the required information (Mitchell, 1994a). More 
generally, some secretariats take on political roles, seeking to embarrass or 
cajole laggards, while others prefer to stay out of the picture and let the 
parties fight their political battles on their own. It is not clear which of these 
strategies is most effective, and the answer may well depend on the nature of 
the circumstances. 
Some observers have pointed to flexibility or adaptability as a source of 
effectiveness. (Flexibility might be considered a matter of design as well as an 
operational issue; its inclusion in this section is not meant to indicate 
otherwise.) Thus, GATI's flexibility is often pointed to as one of the sources 
of its effectiveness. Chayes and Chayes argue more generally that compliance 
with the terms of regulative treaties improves when they are administered in 
a flexible manner, allowing some leeway for 'acceptable' levels of non-
compliance. It is worth pointing out as well that an element of what might 
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be called 'professionalism' (i.e. the absence of cronyism, patronage and 
corruption; rewarding performance according to merit, etc.) probably makes 
for more effective regimes. Some regimes get captured by ambitious, self-
serving bureaucrats, while others - perhaps because their budgets make 
them small prizes - remain in the hands of professionals. 
Concluding Thoughts on Endogenous Factors: The endogenous factors 
contributing to the effectiveness of international institutions have been 
subjected to less rigorous testing than the exogenous factors. Political 
scientists have tended, to date, to extend ongoing debates about Inter-
national Relations more generally into the study of regimes. It so happens 
that at the time political scientists became interested in international regimes 
most of these debates centered on exogenous factors (mainly pertaining to 
power ahd interests) . If research on regimes had blossomed 80 years ago, 
prevailing theoretical debates would probably have focused more attention 
on endogenous factors . As a result, there has been a divide between those 
applying rigorous, scientific methods to questions of limited practical utility, 
and those asking politically important questions but employing much less 
reliable methods in determining the answers. In the succeeding paragraphs, 
we discuss one strategy for overcoming this problem. 
Behavioral Mechanisms. When international regimes operate effectively, they 
make use of endogenous facts (rules, procedures, programs) to alter 
exogenous facts (patterns of influence and interest, behavior of actors). An 
understanding of the phenomenon of effectiveness therefore requires 
analysis at both levels; attempts to discover pieces of the puzzle exclusively 
within one level or the other are bound to yield inconclusive results. What 
we need in order to understand effectiveness, then, are studies of how the 
design features and programmatic activities of institutions interact with the 
configurations of interests and patterns of influence within which they 
operate. Isolated case studies do exist, but we have not yet made much 
progress toward cumulative knowledge in the area that will prove useful to 
both theorists and practitioners. 
One promising approach that has surfaced recently in the study of 
international regimes is to focus attention on behavioral mechanisms 
highlighting specific causal links between institutional facts and behavioral 
outcomes. Such an effort does not replace work aimed at deepening our 
understanding of exogenous and endogenous forces determining effective-
ness. Instead, it can help us make more sense of the overall phenomenon by 
providing a non-arbitrary way to link knowledge of the two levels. 
It can be argued that international environmental regimes achieve 
effectiveness by carrying out three central tasks (Haas et al., 1993: 
'Conclusion'): increasing concern, improving the contractual environment 
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and increasing the capacity of governments. These mechanisms - the three 
Cs - link institutions with their external environment. The appropriate 
mixture of institutional strategies depends on the state of the political 
environment in which an institution is located. Low levels of concern, poor 
contractual environments and weak capacity are each sufficient to cause 
failures in collective management of environmental risks . Therefore, where 
any of these conditions prevails, institutions must intervene to ameliorate 
them in order to achieve their goals. When concern and capacity are high, an 
institution needs only augment the ability of members to make and keep 
contracts to succeed. This may have been the case with regard to postwar 
trade cooperation among advanced industrial states. If concern is also 
lacking, institutions must engage in activities that boost concern. The acid 
rain regime in Europe succeeded in doing this, in part by creating scientific 
working groups and providing forums to embarrass laggards. The nuclear 
non-proliferation regime tries to do this by imposing sanctions on violators. 
Where capacity is also weak, institutions must operate to augment capacity in 
order to be effective. The IMF seeks to do this by helping governments 
reform policies and domestic institutions. 
The contributors to the volume edited by Haas et al. (1993) discovered 
the significance of these causal mechanisms more or less inductively, through 
an effort to develop and interpret seven case studies. But there is a clear need 
for a more systematic examination of behavioral mechanisms. An alternative 
classification of behavioral mechanisms underlies the Dartmouth-based project 
on effectiveness currently nearing completion. These mechanisms, specified 
deductively and subsequently elaborated through empirical investigations, are 
summarized in the succeeding paragraphs (Levy and Young, 1994). 
Regimes as Utility Modifiers: The causal mechanism underlying this 
model draws on the tradition that views actors as self-interested utility 
maximizers. It posits that actors' behavior can be guided by institutional 
arrangements to the extent that they alter the costs and benefits individual 
actors attach to well-defined options. Actors change their behavior if and 
when the rules of the game make it worth their while to do so. The essential 
logic is one of linkage. Regimes modify utility calculations by linking issues 
that were otherwise not linked. They threaten penalties for non-compliance, 
for example, or they promise rewards for compliance. 
Regimes as Enhancers of Cooperation: Although this model also rests on 
utilitarian premises, it is helpful to separate it out for individual treatment 
because it directs attention to the collective-action problems which are 
widely viewed among students of International Relations as important 
obstacles to the achievement of sustained cooperation. The essential point is 
that there are many circumstances under which rational actors engaged in 
interactive decision-making fail to avoid joint losses or reap joint gains due 
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to the effects of strategic behavior. Regimes, on this account, emerge as 
mechanisms for alleviating these problems and allowing the participants to 
achieve collective outcomes that lie closer to the Pareto frontier. Because 
collective-action problems take a variety of forms, regimes created to 
alleviate these problems can affect behavior in a number of ways. They may, 
for example, serve to mitigate fears of cheating through measures designed 
to increase the transparency of the behavior of relevant actors . They may 
reduce incentives to defect either by calling sanctions down upon violators 
or by lengthening the shadow of the future with regard to the issues in 
question. Or they may simply reduce transaction costs by making it 
unnecessary to cope with the consequences of strategic behavior again and 
again in the same issue area. But the basic point remains the same: In this 
model, regimes affect behavior by mitigating the collective-action problems 
that stand as barriers to the avoidance of joint losses or the realization of 
joint gains otherwise available to parties engaged in interactive decision-
making. Much of the recent literature on international regimes has 
proceeded on the assumption that this is their principal function. 
Regimes as Bestowers of Authority: The basic premise of this model is 
that the behavior of states and non-state actors alike is often rooted in a 
respect for authority, rather than in some sort of utilitarian calculus 
concerning the benefits and costs of options available to them. In the case of 
individuals, this is apt to be a consequence of socialization. Most people are 
taught to act in certain ways because it is the right and proper thing to do 
or because it is the law, rather than because it is in their self-interest to do so. 
In general, people are most likely to respond in this way when they feel that 
the authority in question is legitimate and deserving of their respect. Those 
who have escaped the grip of the resultant 'habit of obedience' (Hart, 1961) 
and who routinely question authority are the exceptions in most social 
settings. When we come to collective entities, on the other hand, the 
behavior this model points to is apt to be as much a consequence of 
routinization as of socialization. More often than not, agencies charged with 
the implementation of regimes come to treat the fulfillment of this goal as 
part of their organizational mission to be pursued without constant 
questioning of the social consequences flowing from the rules in question 
and defended in dealings with other agencies pursuing their own missions. 
In both cases, however, it is the authoritativeness of regime rules and 
activities that triggers the behavioral response rather than some calculation 
of the anticipated benefits and costs associated with different options 
available to decision-makers. Those who think in utilitarian, much less realist 
or neorealist, terms may find it hard to believe that behavior of this sort is 
prevalent at the international level, whatever its status in domestic society. 
But it would be a mistake to rule out this source of behavior in examining 
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the behavioral mechanisms that give rise to the effects of international 
regimes. 
Regimes as Learning Facilitators: Institutions, in this model, achieve their 
effects by initiating processes that give rise to individual and social learning. 
The learning in question can take the form of new perspectives on the nature 
of a problem to be solved, new ideas about measures likely to prove effective 
in solving the problem, or new insights into the process of implementing 
these measures. The route to such learning may lead either through the 
generation of new facts that reduce uncertainty or produce a more accurate 
picture of the issues at stake or through the reassessment of values and a 
resultant redefinition of actor interests (Nye, 1987). The evidence suggests, 
for example, that the LRTAP regime has played a role not only in enhancing 
our understanding of the mechanisms at work in long-range air pollution 
but also in energizing a broader process of consciousness-raising regarding 
the importance of the impacts of air pollution on human health and natural 
systems. The actual processes through which learning occurs are not well 
understood. Thus, we need to improve our grasp of the roles of individual 
leaders, communities of scientists and epistemic communities in the learning 
process. But the essential point of this model is clear enough. It spotlights 
the roles that regimes play in changing information and values and, in the 
process, altering the incentives and inten:sts that shape the behavior of 
individuals and collective entities active in the issue areas covered by the 
regimes. 
Regimes as Role Definers: Yet another behavioral model emphasizes the 
fact that regimes sometimes operate at the constitutive level, shaping the 
identity (and therefore the interests) of actors and, in the process, 
influencing the way actors behave as occupants of the roles to which they are 
assigned. Most of us are accustomed to forms of contractarianism that treat 
actors and their interests as given and proceed to analyze the bargaining 
processes through which such actors endeavor to hammer out the terms of 
social contracts. But it is perfectly possible to turn this analysis on its head 
and look at the ways in which institutions operate to define and assign roles . 
In fact, actors regularly take on new roles under the terms of institutional 
arrangements, even when their basic identities are well established prior to 
the emergence of the rules in question. Consider the striking changes in the 
roles of flag, coastal and port states under the new law of the sea and, more 
specifically, the rules relating to exclusive economic zones and marine 
pollution as cases in point. The enhanced role of coastal states certainly 
helped Norway and Russia to phase out third-party fishing in the Barents 
Sea, and the growing strength of coastal and port states in relation to flfg 
states appears to be a factor of some significance in the case of oil pollution. 
Of course, the redefinition of old roles or the creation of new roles may in 
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turn reflect the evolution of underlying ideas regarding relevant issues. But 
the key point here is that the causal mechanism associated with this model 
directs our attention to sources of behavior that lie behind or beneath the 
sorts of factors identified in utilitarian arguments . 
Regimes as Agents of Internal Realignments: What distinguishes this 
model from the others is its emphasis on the proposition that both the 
members of international regimes and others active in the relevant 
behavioral complexes need not be treated as unitary actors. Regimes, on this 
account, affect behavior by creating new constituencies or shifting the 
balance among factions or subgroups vying for influence within individual 
actors. In the simplest cases, the establishment of a regime gives some of 
those involved in an issue area new ammunition in their dealings wi.th others. 
The East-West Helsinki Accord, for instance, may have bolstered American 
human rights advocates in their battles with proponents of detente . Beyond 
this, regimes can actually play some role in restructuring the alignment of 
domestic groups endeavoring to influence a government's behavior or 
factions seeking to redirect a corporation's behavior. GATT may have played 
such a role in breaking the longstanding regional and party divisions on tariff 
issues that formerly dominated American politics. 
5.5 Conclusions on Effectiveness 
Analysis regarding the mechanisms through which regimes succeed or fail 
has been overshadowed by debates over whether international institutions 
matter at all and by efforts to explain their creation. Because the regime 
creation literature has reached a degree of maturity (see Section 3), and 
because we now know that determining whether regimes matter requires us 
to demonstrate how they matter, much more attention is being directed at 
this juncture to questions of effectiveness. Promising work has been carried 
out on exogenous and endogenous sources of effectiveness. Improving our 
understanding of the overall phenomenon, however, will require non-
arbitrary ways to link the two sets of factors . The analysis of behavioral 
mechanisms is one promising vehicle for doing so. 
The three Cs (Haas et al., 1993) and the six behavioral mechanisms (Levy 
and Young, 1994) are two complementary models for elaborating causal 
pathways. The three Cs, for their part, are each quite broad, encompassing 
a wide range of specific mechanisms. The single category 'concern', for 
example, touches on all but one of the six Dartmouth mechanisms 
(enhancers of cooperation). Many of the Dartmouth mechanisms also 
pertain to each of the three Cs. 'Utility modification', for example, can play 
a role in raising concern, building capacity or enhancing the contractual 
environment. This high degree of complementary overlap suggests the 
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possibility of a two-dimensional map of behavioral mechanisms. Although it 
is not clear whether devising such a two-dimensional map would be the most 
productive line of future elaboration, it is clear that more work along these 
lines is called for. 
6. Regime Consequences: Broader Effects 
All approaches to assessing the effectiveness of regimes share an interest in 
determining the extent to which institutions affect outputs, outcomes and 
impacts in the issue areas these arrangements address. But in the real world, 
issue areas are not neatly separated. Developments in one issue area often 
have substantial consequences for other issue areas. Some ecologists, for 
instance, claim that the recently concluded Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations will have serious adverse consequences for the global environ -
ment. As this example suggests, most consequences external to an issue area 
- whether positive or negative - are not intended by those who design 
regimes producing such effects. External consequences are products of a 
functionally differentiated society, the overall complexity of which is too 
great to allow policy-makers to foresee all effects of a given measure. Equally 
important, regimes focused on specific issues affect not only other issue areas 
but also the broader or deeper structure of international society as a whole. 
It is especially important to probe the links between international regimes 
and the underlying constitutive principles of international society (e.g. state 
sovereignty). Without an understanding of this relationship, the study of 
international governance remains truncated. 
Analyzing the broader effects of international regimes, however, is 
difficult. In addition to the complications discussed in the preceding section 
on effectiveness, studies of broader effects have to overcome at least three 
other obstacles. In the first place, regime analysts devote a lot of effort to 
becoming specialists regarding the issue areas they study. Any single person 
will find it extremely difficult to maintain a level of information about other 
international issue areas that would allow for informed judgments about 
broader effects. Moreover, the range of possible broader effects of a given 
international regime is unlimited. Because regime analysis has not yet 
developed a well-defined method for the study of broader effects, a common 
dependent variable to be used in formulating generalizable statements is still 
missing in this field. What is more, one strand of social theory maintains that 
the process of functional differentiation in international society has reached 
a point where causal and interactive complexities make it impossible for 
policy-makers and analysts alike to comprehend the full range of broader 
effects arising from the operation of specific regimes. 
Overall, the study of broader regime consequences is both an important 
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and an especially difficult task for students of international institutions. This 
means that the study of broader effects will always contain an element of 
speculation . On a very general level, however, we may differentiate broader 
regime consequences on the basis of whether they affect states and interstate 
relations or international society and transnational relations. At each level, it 
is helpful to ask whether broader consequences affect actor capabilities, 
interests, cognitive matters or constitutive principles. 
6.1 States and Interstate Relations 
Regimes often redistribute issue-specific resources among their members. 
Yet actors can make use of some resources across issue areas or trade them 
for additional issue-specific resources . The renunciation of nuclear weapons 
by Germany and Japan in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, for instance, 
increased their dependence on American security resources. In the early 
1970s, at least, the United States was able to utilize this situation to extract 
concessions in the economic sphere. With the exception of the work of 
Joseph Grieco (1990), who maintains ~hat an unequal distribution of 
benefits from cooperation constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to regime-
building in an anarchical society, little effort has been made so far to explore 
the broader consequences of regime impacts on the distribution of state 
capacities. 
Recent studies have emphasized that regimes are not simply static 
complexes of rules and norms. They may also serve as important vehicles for 
individual and social learning. Of course, some learning features improve-
ments in the understanding of governments about cause-effect relationships 
in a regime's issue area. But a broader type of learning occurs when a 
principle applicable to more than one issue area proves successful in specific 
cases. The idea of 'embedded liberalism', for example, arose in connection 
with international trade after World War II. But over time it became an 
influential principle in other economic issue areas as well (Ruggie, 1983; 
Burley, 1993). Similarly, broader effects may occur when a specific inter-
national regime plays a role in altering general perceptions of other actors . 
Confidence-building measures in East-West relations, for example, contrib-
uted to the development of a friendlier image of the Soviet Union in 
Western Europe (Rittberger et al., 1990). In addition to cognitive changes 
relating to cause-effect relationships and intentions ascribed to other actors, 
regimes may also affect value hierarchies and, as a result, the formulation of 
interests . Learning about the dangers of global warming as a result of the 
operation of the climate change regime, for instance, may lead to changes 
that go beyond mere 'adaptation' to a redefinition of the goals of policy (E . 
Haas, 1990). Such fundamental redefinitions would have effects reaching 
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beyond the issue area of climate change, since climate change necessarily 
involves a host of economic issues. 
With respect to constitutive concerns, neofunctionalists and other recent 
integration theorists emphasize that nation-building and international 
integration are much more results of generative processes than conscious 
decisions. For the most part, the issue of political integration arose when 
people demanded more adequate services of one kind or another from their 
governments. Integration was first considered as a possible means to further 
these ends rather than as an end in itself(Deutsch et al., 1957: 90) . Thus, an 
increasing density of international regimes, all created for different purposes, 
may initiate a takeoff towards political integration . In this sense, the study of 
international regimes offers a micro-level approach to understanding the 
macro-level phenomenon of integration. Along the same lines, any given 
regime not only reflects an end toward which the norms and rules are 
directed, it also involves a procedure for regulating conflicts. When 
international regimes are seen as procedures for the regulation of conflict, it 
becomes plausible to think of these institutions as contributing to a civilizing 
process in international politics, in which the conduct of conflict is 
institutionalized and does not lead to a resort to violence (Rittberger and 
Zurn, 1990). Interestingly, both integration theory and Elias's (1976) 
theory of civilization highlight the existence of a 'core area' or a 'hegemon' 
as a prerequisite for such processes. 
6.2 International Society and Transnational Relations 
Compliance with regime rules entails the possibility of domestic redistribu-
tion of resources. A free-trade regime which favors producers and consumers 
or certain industrial sectors may hurt workers or other sectors. Such effects 
reach beyond the given issue area by empowering certain domestic groups 
and creating new coalitions that may influence the overall foreign policy of 
a state . Milner (1988) and Rogowski (1989), for example, demonstrate that 
international institutions empowered agents of liberalism in OECD coun-
tries, thus creating domestic structures that fostered the growth of a general 
foreign policy orientation that comes close to the ideal type of a trading state 
(Rosecrance, 1987). On this account, 'domestic social actors, not states, are 
the agents of interdependence' (Milner, 1988: 291). 
Similarly, international institutions can create opportunities and incentives 
for increased transnational activities on the part of various social actors and, 
as a result, for the emergence of influential transnational coalitions. These 
coalitions often stimulate social learning and promote orientations that favor 
international cooperation. Since the Single European Act strengthened the 
role of majority voting in the European Union and consequently weakened 
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the effect of national vetoes, for example, many European interest groups 
have opened offices in Brussels (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991). In the 
process, this development has created new opportunities for the establish-
ment of transnational networks. As students of international environmental 
politics have demonstrated, moreover, the formation of regimes can 
empower issue networks and stimulate the creation of epistemic commu-
nities (Haas, 1992). Although the immediate effects of the creation of such 
networks and communities are normally issue area specific, intensified 
transnational relations provide an important opportunity for ongoing social 
learning likely to have broader effects (Risse-Kappen, 1994; Leatherman et 
al., 1993 ). Older studies of transnational relations often emphasized this 
learning effect. Learning of this sort may involve both changes in the way 
cause-effect relationships are understood within and across issue areas and a 
better grasp of the intentions underlying the actions of others. It may also 
affect the way international actors think of their interests (J achtenfuchs, 
1993). 
Moving onto constitutive matters, we turn first to the idea that the 
redistribution of domestic resources and the creation of transnational 
coalitions, taken together, may produce domestic repercussions leading to 
changes in internal political structures. Although this line of thinking is 
highly speculative, there is no reason to exclude it from a study of broader 
consequences of regimes, as work on the 'second image reversed' (e.g. 
Katzenstein, 1984) clearly demonstrates. Insofar as international regimes 
contribute to the rise of transnational issue networks, epistemic communities 
and transnational social movements, moreover, they contribute to the 
growth of challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty and community. 
In a sweeping statement, Camilleri and Falk (1992: 232) portray trans-
national movements as sources of 'support for a new system of multiple 
allegiances and jurisdictions, held together not by supreme authority but by 
an emerging world culture and a dynamic network of communities, 
movements and organizations'. As the European Union example demon-
strates, shifts in policy-making hierarchies may also affect the loyalties of the 
populace and the boundaries of imagined communities in complex ways. 
Whereas European integration was accompanied for a long time by a 
growing sense of European identity on the part of many, a more nationalist 
counter-movement has recently emerged. 
Tracing complex, long-term processes, such as the impact of international 
regimes on domestic structures and on the constitutive principles of 
international society poses a tremendous analytical challenge. Yet it seems 
important to tackle such matters in order to contribute to the discussion of 
'big questions', involving issues like 'the diminished role of state sover-
eignty' and 'international governance' . Conclusive answers to these 
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questions will not come from the study of individual regimes. Studies that 
cut across issue areas and that compare and contrast different regimes are 
needed in this context. The informational requirements for such studies are 
so great that they cannot be handled effectively by individual scholars 
working alone. The emergence of a number of large, collaborative projects 
dealing with international regimes is therefore an encouraging sign. 
7. The Road Ahead 
What can we conclude from this survey about current gaps, growth areas 
and research priorities in the field of regime analysis? As documented in the 
preceding sections, regime analysis has established itself as a going concern 
- even a growth industry - among students of international relations. 
Despite some continuing debates about definitional matters, the concept of 
international regimes has emerged as an analytically robust construct 
encompassing a sizable universe of cases. Interest has shifted from an initial 
preoccupation with regime formation to a concentrated effort to understand 
when and how international institutions affect collective outcomes in 
international society, a positive sign in the sense that this is a matter that 
must be confronted successfully if regime analysis is to acquire intellectual 
staying power. What is more, major contributions to this line of inquiry are 
increasingly coming from Europe and beyond, so that it is fair to conclude 
that regime analysis is more than just another passing fancy of the American 
scholarly community (Rittberger, 1993b). 
These are important achievements. But they should not distract us from a 
consideration of current gaps and future directions. In this final section, we 
turn to a consideration of the next phase of regime analysis, singling out a 
number of areas that require more concentrated attention and that show 
promise of being ripe for such attention in the sense that investments of time 
and energy in analyzing them now are likely to yield sizable dividends over 
the next five to ten years. The result is a science agenda for the field of 
regime analysis . This will pave the way for a brief concluding discussion of 
the role of a regimes database, the construction of which provided the initial 
stimulus for this state-of-the-art survey. To lend focus to the assessment that 
follows, we start each observation about growth areas and research priorities 
with a specific question. 
1. How can we supplement contractarian thinking with other modes of 
thought (e.g. agent-structure analysis) in our efforts to understand the nature 
of international regimes? Most studies of regimes assume that potential 
regime members exist as fully functioning entities prior to the emergence of 
collective-action problems. On this account, actors whose identities, inter-
ests and preferences are determined through some exogenous process 
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interact with each other in ways that generate collective-action problems 
and, at some point, realize that they may be able to eliminate or alleviate 
these problems by devising mutually agreeable institutional arrangements 
that will serve to guide their subsequent interactions. The obvious focus 
then is on the processes through which groups of actors endeavor, 
successfully or unsuccessfully, to arrive at social contracts establishing the 
constitutive rules of regimes. This line of analysis has proved rewarding; it 
has produced much of what we currently know about the dynamics of 
international regimes. Yet it is also important to reverse the relationship 
between actors and institutions and ask when and how prevailing institutions 
operate to determine, or at least influence, the identities and therefore the 
interests and preferences of the members of a social group. This is exactly 
what analysts like Alexander Wendt, using the agent- structure construct and 
arguing that social structure exerts a substantial influence on the identities of 
individual members of societies, have proposed (Wendt, 1987, 1992). There 
is a sense also in which the views of neorealists like Kenneth Waltz reflect this 
mode of thought (Waltz, 1979), and such perspectives will surely resonate 
with policy-makers acting on behalf of the 'new' states that have joined 
international society over the last 50 years . The implications of this reversal 
of the mainstream view of regimes are far reaching. For example, actors 
whose identities are derived, in part at least, from the character of the social 
institutions to which they belong will have a dramatically different view of 
the issue of compliance with institutional rules than those whose interests 
and preferences are independent of their institutional memberships. The 
point of drawing this distinction is not to argue that one or the other 
approach is correct. Rather, the challenge before us is to capitalize on the 
insights emerging from agent/structure perspectives without jeopardizing 
the achievements of mainstream contractarian analyses. 
2. To what extent does problem structure or the pre-existing constellation of 
actor interests determine the outcomes of efforts to form regimes and the 
consequences flowing from regimes once they are in place? Basing their 
arguments on models of interactive decision-making, many regime analysts 
have focused on problem structures and interest constellations as deter-
minants of success in efforts to solve collective-action problems. The 
game-theoretically inclined, for example, have drawn a distinction between 
coordination problems (for example, battle of the sexes) in which there are 
stable equilibria and collaboration problems (for instance, prisoner's 
dilemma or chicken) in which equilibria are either suboptimal or absent 
(Stein, 1983; Martin, 1992; Zurn, 1992). Whereas incentives to cheat and, 
therefore, concerns about the development of compliance mechanisms 
constitute a central concern in dealing with collaboration problems, there is 
much less need to worry about such matters in coming to terms with 
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coordination problems. Others have focused on measures of the severity or 
intensity of conflicts of interest among interactive decision-makers - the 
idea of a spectrum ranging from pure cooperation to pure or zero-sum 
conflict is popular in such analyses - and argued that the intensity of 
conflicts of interest or the 'malignness' of problems is an important 
determinant not only of success in efforts to create institutions but also of 
the effectiveness of institutions once they are in place (Wettestad and 
Andresen, 1991). It is important to distinguish, on this account, between 
types of conflicts such as conflicts about values, which are the most difficult 
to solve, and conflicts about absolutely assessed goods, which are relatively 
easy to solve (Rittberger and Zurn, 1990). Such arguments all assume that 
problem structures and interest constellations are independent of the 
interactive process itself. Yet there are reasons to believe that many situations 
violate this assumption to a considerable extent. Participants in interactive 
decision-making seldom see themselves as operating in an environment in 
which the problem is fixed at the outset; their interactions frequently have an 
integrative or productive dimension in the sense that the parties learn more 
about the problem, invent new ways of thinking about it or even redefine 
the character of the problem itself in their dealings with each other. There is 
a sense, then, in which problems are malleable and problem structure is a 
variable affected by the interactions of participating actors. Under such 
conditions, actors may devise regimes that are mutually beneficial without 
ever spelling out definitively the structure of the problem they are seeking to 
solve . This is not to deny the insights arising from efforts to differentiate 
analytically distinct problem structures and constellations of interests. But it 
does suggest that we need to be cautious in drawing inferences about regime 
formation and problem-solving from such distinctions . 
3. How should we deal with the fact that the members of international 
regimes - sovereign states for the most part - are complex collective entities 
rather than unitary actors? Understandably, most studies of regimes have 
treated the actors involved in the formation and operation of international 
institutions as rational utility maximizers weighing benefits and costs and 
making choices among clear options. The tractability of models based on 
this vision has played a vital role in producing valuable insights regarding the 
creation and operation of institutional arrangements . Yet this perspective 
abstracts away many important elements of the behavior of actors participat-
ing in international regimes. Most actors have crowded political agendas, so 
that efforts to deal with specific regimes are affected by the treatment of 
other issues unfolding simultaneously and may even be shunted aside in the 
rush to deal with more pressing concerns. When actors do focus on specific 
regimes, they are likely to experience internal disagreements over the relative 
merits of different institutional options at the international level. This is the 
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essential idea behind the concept of two-level games, a perspective 
highlighting the fact that the positions actors adopt in international 
negotiations are products of domestic bargaining and that the course of 
international negotiations, in turn , can become a determinant of the course 
of domestic bargaining (Putnam, 1988). Nor do these complications come 
to an end once parties reach agreement on the terms of international 
regimes. On the contrary, the configuration of political forces affecting the 
implementation of international regimes may differ substantially from the 
line-up involved in regime formation. Under the circumstances, regimes in 
practice may differ significantly from the expectations of their creators; 
regimes agreed to on paper may even become non-starters or dead letters in 
practice. The point of these observations is not to deny the value of models 
assuming unitary actors but rather to highlight the need to supplement these 
models with analyses that recognize the internal processes determining the 
behavior of individual actors regarding the creation and operation of 
regimes. 
4. What are the determinants of the willingness and ability of states to 
implement the provisions of international regimes in dealing with a variety of 
actors operating under their jurisdiction? A distinctive feature of inter-
national regimes is that there is often a separation between the members of 
these institutional arrangements (that is, states) and many of those whose 
behavior is their ultimate target (for example, banks, manufacturers, power 
plants, airlines, shipping companies, fishers) . For this reason, the imple-
mentation of regimes normally requires states to translate the provisions of 
international agreements into domestic prescriptions (often, but not always, 
through the passage of implementing legislation) and to devise means of 
eliciting compliance from targets of these prescriptions who are subject to 
their jurisdiction. This arrangement has some attractions for those con-
cerned about the effectiveness of international regimes (for example, it 
alleviates some concerns about the weakness of compliance mechanisms at 
the international level). At the same time, it highlights the importance of 
examining the willingness and the capacity of member states to implement 
the provisions of international regimes (Jacobson and Weiss, 1995; Hanf 
and Underdal, forthcoming). Predictably, states vary greatly in these terms. 
This is partly a matter of differences relating to political structures. States 
differ, for instance, in the extent to which the provisions of international 
agreements take precedence legally over municipal laws and in the extent to 
which opponents of international regimes are able to make their preferences 
felt in the policy process. More broadly, this topic directs attention to the 
importance of state-society relations in any examination of the effectiveness 
of international regimes. Thus, strong states may be better situated than 
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weak states to guide the behavior of actors operating under their juris-
diction. Hierarchical states in which great authority is vested in the central 
government will find it easier to translate the provisions of international 
regimes into national law than decentralized systems in which the central 
government has limited authority over regional and local governments. 
Similarly, states that own or directly control large segments of the means of 
production in their societies should find it easier to exercise control over 
actor behavior than those operating in social settings featuring private 
property and strict limits on the regulatory authority of the state. Yet it 
remains an open question what kind of domestic structure most effectively 
changes behavioral patterns toward regime goals . It follows that simple 
generalizations about the domestic implementation of regime provisions 
need to be scrutinized with care. 
5. To what extent do we need to supplement (or supplant) the enforcement/ 
sanctions model in thinking about compliance with the terms of international 
regimes? Much thinking about social institutions rests on the (often implicit) 
assumption that the probability of being caught and punished is a key 
determinant of whether subjects elect to comply with or to violate the rules. 
On this account, the absence of a central government capable of enforcing 
the provisions of international regimes is a critical weakness of international 
society. In the eyes of some, this problem casts doubt on the whole 
enterprise of regime analysis. But this argument rests on a limited 
understanding of the bases of compliance at every level of social organiza-
tion. The imposition of sanctions by central governments is not a critical 
basis of compliance with many domestic laws and other prescriptions 
(Young, 1979). Levels of compliance are respectably high with regard to the 
rules of many, though by no means all , international regimes. This suggests 
that we need to think systematically about other bases of compliance and the 
conditions that determine their relevance to various issue areas ( Chayes and 
Chayes, 1993, 1995; Mitchell, 1993). How important is transparency and 
various procedures for monitoring and implementation review that often go 
with it? What is the role of social pressure, in contrast to sanctions imposed 
by public authorities, as a determinant of compliance with international 
rules? Do feelings of ownership arising from meaningful participation in 
rule-making processes and the sense of legitimacy that such feelings 
engender make a difference when it comes to compliance with the rules? 
The point of raising these questions is not to replace the conventional 
enforcement/ sanctions model of compliance with some simple alternative. 
They indicate, instead, that numerous bases of compliance may operate 
simultaneously or play different roles in various issue areas, so that there is a 
need for much greater sophistication in efforts to explain or predict levels of 
compliance with the provisions of specific regimes. 
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6. What is the role of non-state actors in the creation and operation of 
international regimes? Despite the arguments presented by those who speak 
of the emergence of a global civil society (Lipschutz, 1992; Wapner, 1992 ), 
there is not yet much evidence for concluding that states are losing their 
place as the dominant (normally sole) members of international regimes. Yet 
this conclusion is not inconsistent with the observation that numerous non-
state actors are gaining influence not only in processes of regime creation 
but also in the administration of regimes at the international level and the 
implementation of regimes within municipal forums (Princen and Finger, 
1994). Non-governmental organizations regularly play important roles in 
framing issues and designing the provisions of international regimes. 
Increasingly, they are represented on national delegations and are allowed to 
make presentations in their own right during negotiations giving rise to new 
institutions. These organizations have gained access as well to many of the 
commissions and scientific committees established to administer regimes at 
the international level. They loom large in many cases as watchdogs, 
publicizing non-compliant or ambiguous behavior on the part of regime 
members and bringing pressure to bear on international commissions to take 
their mandates seriously and to confront sensitive issues squarely. There is 
ample evidence to suggest, moreover, that both the desire and the capacity 
of these organizations to intervene in such matters is growing across a wide 
range of issue areas. What this suggests is that we need to set aside sterile 
arguments about the decline of the nation-state and the rise of non-state 
actors and get on with the analysis of the roles non-state actors actually play 
in a society whose membership is still composed largely of states. This should 
increase the subtlety and sophistication of our grasp of international regimes, 
without requiring any fundamental alteration of the basic idea that regimes 
are social institutions created by states to eliminate or alleviate collective-
action problems at the international level (Haufler, 1993) . 
7. How should we deal with institutional linkages among differentiable 
regimes operative in international society? For the most part, analyses of 
international regimes have focused on individual arrangements on the 
assumption that they are self-contained or stand-alone institutions to be 
studied in isolation from one another. This procedure has obvious attrac-
tions from the point of view of tractability; it has undoubtedly aided in our 
initial efforts to understand the nature and significance of regimes. Yet it is 
apparent that institutional linkages are widespread - and becoming more so 
- in international society. Specific regimes are often embedded in larger 
systems of norms and principles, such as the liberal international economic 
order of the postwar period (Ruggie, 1983). Individual provisions are 
regularly nested into overarching frameworks, as in the case of substantive 
protocols set into the context of a broader framework agreement. Two or 
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more regimes created for entirely different purposes can intersect with each 
other with far-reaching consequences, as we have come to realize in recent 
years in the context of the environment and trade debate. Just as we have 
learned to think systematically about issue linkages in the creation and 
operation of individual regimes, therefore, we must now turn our attention 
to institutional linkages. This should help us to understand questions 
concerning such matters as the conditions under which existing regimes 
spawn additional institutions, regimes created for separate purposes interfere 
with each other's operation, and initially unrelated regimes grow together to 
form larger institutional complexes governing relations among groups of 
actors in international society. 
8 . Do international regimes exhibit identifiable life cycles, and can we 
develop propositions about processes of regime growth and decay? Although 
regime formation has occupied center stage in the field of regime analysis, 
many observers have noted that regimes change continuously over time and 
that some regimes decline or go out of existence even as others are coming 
on stream. Interestingly, trajectories of regime decay appear to vary greatly. 
Some regimes acquire a life of their own and remain intact long after the 
forces that produced them have dissipated or shifted to other issues. In other 
cases, regimes that have proved effective for relatively long periods collapse 
quickly as circumstances (often, but not always, involving technological 
developments) change. It is clear, even at this early stage, that regime decay 
or, more broadly, regime change is not some simple function of shifts in the 
configuration of power in the material sense; there is therefore little 
likelihood that we can explain or predict the course of regime change by 
constructing some index of shifts in the distribution of structural power. 
This may seem disappointing from the point of view of analytic tractability. 
But it opens up a large and important area of inquiry relating to 
international regimes that has not been pursued systematically by students of 
institutions. Treating institutional change as the dependent variable, studies 
of this kind present attractive opportunities for examining the relative 
importance of material conditions (for example, shifts in population 
densities or patterns of economic growth) and ideas (for instance, the 
growing concern for anthropogenic change in large natural systems) as 
determinants of regime change. Such studies may also shed light on the 
extent to which regimes themselves are self-maintaining in the sense that 
they have built-in mechanisms al1owing them to adjust or adapt to changes 
in the natural and social environments within which they operate. 
9. How can we combine the insights of the rationalists and the reflectivists 
(Keohane, 1989) to improve our understanding of international regimes? It is 
probably fair to say that the largest single strand of regime analysis is the 
work of those who adhere to one variety or another of neopositivism (often 
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called rationalists) in search of generalizations that can be linked to empirical 
observations in a more or less straightforward manner. We belong to this 
group ourselves. Yet it is important to point out that the analysis of 
international regimes has attracted the attention of a number of scholars 
(sometimes called reflectivists) who bring other approaches to knowledge 
and evidence to this endeavor (Kohler-Koch, 1989). This second stream of 
work includes a variety of components, such as the historicism of those who 
have looked at regimes as path-dependent constructs, the linguistic and legal 
analyses of those who have endeavored to sort out different types of rules, 
and the critical theory of those who see regimes as expressions oflarger social 
forces at work in human affairs (Keeley, 1990; Hurrell, 1993; Kratochwil, 
1993) . Taken together, the contributions of these reflexivist scholars have 
added a number of dimensions to our understanding of the nature and role 
of institutions in international society. The challenge confronting us now is 
to devise methods for drawing on both of these streams of analysis in the 
interests of developing a deeper understanding of international regimes than 
either body of work alone can support. This will not be an easy task. Not only 
is it difficult to frame the findings of the rationalists in reflexivist terms and 
vice versa, but there is also a tendency on the part of both groups to disparage 
the contributions of the other. Yet the future of regime analysis may well turn 
in considerable measure on our ability to find the language and analytic 
procedures needed to bridge this gap. 
10. Can we derive design principles from the study of international regimes 
that will prove useful to practitioners responsible for creating or restructuring 
such institutional arrangements? The appeal of translating the findings of 
regime analysis into design principles is easy to understand. It provides 
scholars with the satisfaction of feeling that their work is relevant to the 
world of social policy. Equally important, it makes the world of research 
useful to policy-makers and offers a justification for continuing to support 
the endeavors of scholars. Yet the gap between regime analysis in its current 
form and the design of specific international institutions is wide. Partly, this 
is a matter of the presence of sharp differences of opinion among students of 
regimes and the resultant lack of consensus within this community on the 
formulation of powerful generalizations. In part, it is a consequence of the 
contingent nature of most propositions about the creation and operation of 
international regimes. What this means is that conclusions drawn from one 
set of cases or from one issue area frequently fail to generalize to others, and 
analysts are seldom in a position to make clear predictions regarding the 
consequences likely to flow from the choice of specific institutional 
arrangements to deal with current problems. To this we must add that the 
creation of regimes in international society normally involves the give-and-
take of institutional bargaining, so that the institutions that emerge are 
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hybrid arrangements arising from deals made in the interests of reaching 
closure in the bargaining process. Although hybrid vigor may be a common 
phenomenon in other realms, there is no basis for expecting such mixed 
arrangements to produce particularly desirable outcomes in the realm of 
international institutions. Nonetheless, we cannot and should not abandon 
the search for usable design principles in the analysis of international 
regimes. The case for combining theory and praxis in this field of analysis is 
compelling both from the perspective of those seeking to add to our 
knowledge of international institutions and from the vantage point of those 
responsible for creating and operating them. 
To conclude, we offer some brief observations regarding the relationship 
between this survey of regime analysis and the creation of the regimes 
database that led us to undertake this assessment in the first place . The 
dominant methodology among students of international regimes features 
the conduct of structured and focused case studies. Such studies have the 
virtue of providing empirically grounded and detailed accounts of actual 
regimes. But they leave much to be desired in terms of the generalizability of 
their findings . For the most part, the cases chosen for analysis do not 
constitute representative samples of the larger universe of international 
regimes. In many instances, there are legitimate concerns regarding the 
influence of selection bias in the choice of cases. This makes it difficult to 
conduct natural experiments featuring comparisons of situations with and 
without regimes; it virtually precludes studies focusing on variance in the 
classificatory variables we outlined in Section 2 of this article . 
What is needed to alleviate this problem is a database containing 
comparable information on a growing collection of regimes. The develop-
ment of such a database must begin with clear and uniform criteria for 
identifying regimes, so that we can be sure we are dealing with a well-
defined universe of cases that are homogeneous with regard to their defining 
characteristics. We must then proceed to add a set of variables that are 
conceptually consistent in the sense that key concepts are used in the same 
way by all those contributing to the database and that are calibrated in the 
sense that procedures for taking readings on these variables are uniform. 
Building such a database can play a critical role in pursuing the science 
agenda set forth in the preceding pages; the research program outlined here 
will also contribute to the continuing growth of the database. To be sure, 
this effort is most relevant to the research agenda of those who operate 
within the realm of neopositivism broadly construed. This is a significant 
limitation; we must not allow the development of a regimes database to 
deflect our attention from the need to find ways to integrate the 
contributions of the rationalists and the reflexivists. In the realm of 
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empirically grounded efforts to construct generalizations or to probe causal 
mechanisms, however, the regimes database should become a powerful and 
widely used tool in efforts to expand our understanding of the role of 
institutions in coping with difficult international problems. 
Notes 
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(IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria. We are grateful to the llASA for its support; and to 
Hua Dong and Cara Morris for assistance in preparing the manuscript . Peter Mayer 
and Ron Mitchell provided helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1. In their article eloquently entitled 'International Organization: A State of the 
Art on the Art of the State', Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie 1986, 
provide an intellectual history of the development of research on international 
organizations rather than a report on the study of international regimes. 
2. 'International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given 
issue-area' (Krasner 1983b: 2). 
3. This definition meshes well with influential formulations by Keohane (1989: 3), 
who sees institutions as 'persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and 
informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expecta-
tions' and by Young ( 1989: 5 ), who defines institutions as 'identifiable practices 
of recognized roles linked by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations 
among the occupants of these roles' . 
4. 'Patterned behavior' as an operational measure of regimes was suggested by 
Puchala and Hopkins (1983: 63). 
5. The assessment of rule-consistent behavior does not require causal statements, as 
the assessment of rule-guided behavior would. 
6 . This operational version of the consensus definition emerged as a result of 
lengthy discussions during a 'Regimes Summit' held at Dartmouth College 
during November 1991. See Oran Young (199lb). This report includes a list of 
participants in the discussions. See also Keohane (1993: 26-9 ), Rittberger 
(1993b: 8-11), Zurn (1992: 140-6). 
7. See Kreile (1989) referring to Harald Muller's (1989) excellent account of the 
'non-proliferation Regime' that would have been weaker analytically if the 
distinction between principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures had 
not been applied. 
8. In practice, international organizations and international regimes are often 
closely intermeshed. Specific international organizations regularly perform a 
number of functions for international regimes, including monitoring, 
information-gathering and rule-revising. On the other hand, international 
organizations can operate as regime-making mechanisms (e .g. the CSCE in the 
development of many East-West regimes) . 
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9. Keohane's (1989: 4 ) use of the term 'convention' differs from ours. He refers to 
implicit rules and understandings (without telling us how to identify them). His 
notion of conventions is clearly different from that of Lewis, who would describe 
dress codes as conventions, whether or not they are explicitly stated. 
10 . At another point, Ostrom ( 1990: 52) also distinguishes between operational, 
collective-choice and constitutional rules. This distinction resembles the one 
between substantive and decision -making rules suggested in the regime 
definition. 
11. A separate distinction deals with the degree to which regime members are 
conscious of the contents of a regime's rules and able to articulate them clearly. 
Informal rules may be explicit in the sense that analysts have no trouble 
identifying them clearly, even though regime members may have difficulty 
articulating them. 
12. Besides being robust with respect to a given constellation of interests, however, 
international regimes may foster learning processes that make the constellation 
of international interests more conducive to institutionalized cooperation. The 
GAIT regime may be construed as an example of this phenomenon. See Milner 
( 1988 ), Rogowski ( 1989) and Section 6 of this article. 
13. Yet even the process of transition shows signs of regime robustness. The degree 
to which new states, such as Russia and Ukraine, are willing to take on the 
institutional commitments of the former Soviet Union can hardly be accounted 
for without referring to factors like regime robustness . See Schimmelfennig 
(1994) . 
14. Some environmentalists have criticized efforts to improve safety provisions for 
East European and former Soviet nuclear reactors on these grounds. 
15. The Dartmouth project on effectiveness distinguishes ' first order effectiveness' 
(a correlation of raw outcomes) from 'sophisticated effectiveness' (a correlation 
combined with a demonstration of causal links). 
16. This section draws liberally from Levy (1993b). 
17. Because most of the studies referred to in this paragraph were not aimed at 
answering questions about effectiveness, this shortcoming does not necessarily 
reflect negatively on them. 
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